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Abstract 
The Tibet Question is the continuing political conflict over Tibet’s status with regards 
to China.  On one side are Tibetan nationalists and their supporters throughout the world.  
On the other side is the People’s Republic of China.  Although many scholars have 
examined the Tibet Question from a political or diplomatic perspective, none have addressed 
how everyday Americans became sympathetic to the Tibetan nationalist principles that 
motivate international Tibet support organizations today: that Tibet was an independent 
nation before 1949, that the People’s Republic of China illegally conquered and occupied 
Tibet in 1949, and that Tibet consists of all areas that Tibetans historically inhabited.  
The Tibet Question endures as a perennial issue in Sino-American relations.  The 
following examines how American journalists shaped everyday Americans’ perception of the 
Tibet Question from 1950 to 1959 in the absence of overt American government 
involvement.  Using such popular print news media as The New York Times, among others, 
the following demonstrates that American journalists faced political, geographic, and 
technical limitations while reporting on news from Tibet.  Ultimately, American journalists 
framed the Tibet Question within the dialectic of the Cold War, thereby creating a version of 
the Tibet Question that was palatable to their readers while generating sympathy for Tibetan 
nationalist principles.  Remarkably, everyday Americans’ sympathy for the Tibetan 
nationalist cause survives to this day.  
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Introduction 
 The Tibet Question is the continuing political conflict over Tibet’s status with regards 
to China.  Tibetan nationalists and their supporters around the world argue that Tibet is an 
independent, sovereign nation under illegal Chinese occupation.  The People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) holds Tibet as an integral, inseparable part of a multi-ethnic Chinese state.  
Further complicating the Tibet Question, neither side agrees on Tibet’s exact borders.  
Tibetan nationalists and their sympathizers define “Tibet” as all areas that Tibetans have 
historically inhabited, including the central Tibetan provinces of U-Tsang, the northeast 
province of Amdo, and the eastern province of Kham.  This ethnic-geographic definition is 
sometimes called “greater” or “ethnographic” Tibet.  However, the PRC defines “Tibet” as 
only the region that the Dalai Lama’s government in Lhasa administered before 1950, which 
currently roughly corresponds to the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) within the PRC.  
This definition is also known as “political” Tibet.  Today, more than half of ethnic Tibetans 
in the PRC reside outside of the TAR in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan provinces1.   
 In what Tibetologist Tsering Shakya calls “political myth-making,” both sides in the 
conflict point to the same events and evidence to reach opposite conclusions about Tibet’s 
history2.  Shakya and anthropologist and Tibet scholar Melvyn C. Goldstein agree that the 
battle for Tibet’s history often reduces historical discourse to an emotional and polemical 
dialectic3.  As a consequence, the historiography of the Tibet Question typically falls into 
one of the two sides’ camps.  East Asian historian A. Tom Grunfeld’s critics point out that 
                                                 
1  Warren W. Smith Jr., China's Tibet?: Autonomy or Assimilation (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2009), 24-25. 
2  Tsering Shakya, The Dragon in the Land of Snows: A History of Modern Tibet Since 1947 (New York, NY: 
Penguin Group, 1999), xxviii. 
3 Shakya, The Dragon in the Land of Snows, xxvii; Melvyn C. Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon: 
China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama (Berkeley & Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1999), ix-x. 
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he characterizes pre-1950 Tibet as a nation in bondage4 and that his interpretation of Tibetan 
history in The Making of Modern Tibet “is closer than warranted to the history written by the 
People’s Republic of China5.” Conversely, international relations specialist and writer for 
Radio Free Asia Warren W. Smith Jr.’s monograph, Tibetan Nation: A History of Tibetan 
Nationalism and Sino-Tibetan Relations, draws fire for being “an erudite polemic for Tibetan 
independence in which Smith disdains to conceal the link between his politics and his 
scholarship6.”  
 Although there exists an increasing depth of scholarship on the Tibet Question from a 
political or diplomatic perspective, scholars who belong to either pole of the historical 
debate, such as Grunfeld and Smith, or even those in between, such as Shakya and Goldstein, 
have not addressed how everyday Americans initially became sympathetic to the Tibetan 
nationalist cause.  Goldstein only writes, “Although Tibet occupies a remote part of the 
world, the Tibet Question has captured the imagination and sympathy of many in America 
and the West and resonates throughout the American political landscape.  It has also become 
a significant irritant in Sino-American relations7.”  International Tibetan support 
organizations such as Free Tibet (founded 1987), the International Campaign for Tibet 
(1988), and Students for a Free Tibet (1994) base their crusade on three Tibetan nationalist 
principles: that Tibet was an independent, sovereign nation before 1949, that the PRC 
illegally invaded and occupied Tibet in 1949, and that Tibet consists of all regions that 
                                                 
4 Tashi Rabgey, “review of The Making of Modern Tibet by A. Tom Grunfeld,” The Journal of Asian Studies, 
vol. 58 (May 1999), 506. 
5 June Teufel Dreyer, “review of The Making of Modern Tibet by A. Tom Grunfeld,” The Journal of Asian 
Studies, vol. 47 (May 1988), 347. 
6 Barry Sautman, “review of Tibetan Nation: A History of Tibetan Nationalism and Sino-Tibetan Relations by 
Warren W. Smith Jr. & The Dragon in the Land of Snows by Tsering Shakya,” The China Quarterly, vol. 
171 (Sep. 2002), 774. 
7 Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon, ix. 
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Tibetans historically inhabited, which is why they put the beginning of the PRC’s invasion in 
1949 when the PRC took over administration of parts of ethnographic Tibet8.   
 However, these sorts of international organizations do not explain Americans’ 
imagination and sympathy for Tibet and Tibetan nationalist principles.  Rather, American 
news coverage of Tibet from 1950 to 1959 shaped everyday Americans’ perception of the 
Tibet Question.  Unable to witness the diplomatic goings-on behind the scenes, the 
American public’s perception of the Tibet Question formed from what it could glean from the 
pages of such newspapers as the New York Times or such news magazines as Time and 
Newsweek.  Piggy-backing on other international issues, Sino-Tibetan conflict during the 
Cold War drove journalistic discussion of Tibet and Tibet rose and fell repeatedly within the 
American news cycle.  However, at no point did American journalists set foot inside Tibet 
in the 1950’s.  Political, geographic, and technical limitations caused the quality of 
journalism to suffer as American reporters often relied on unnamed or biased sources.  
Ultimately, American journalistic conversation of Tibet and the Tibet Question was one-
sided, favoring the Tibetan nationalist interpretation over the Communist PRC’s.     
 Discussing Tibetan history presents special problems with regards to terminology.  
Grunfeld writes, “In the highly emotional state of Tibetan studies, even the choice of certain 
terms is taken as a political statement9.” For example, the PRC “conquered” and “occupied” 
Tibet from the Tibetan nationalist viewpoint, but from the opposite perspective, the PRC 
“peacefully liberated” Tibet.  In a book review of Goldstein’s A History of Modern Tibet, 
                                                 
8  “10 Facts About Tibet,” Free Tibet, http://www.freetibet.org/about/10-facts-about-tibet (accessed Mar. 9, 
2011); “Tibet Statistics,” International Campaign for Tibet, http://www.savetibet.org/resource-center/all-
about-tibet/tibet-statistics (accessed Mar. 9, 2011); “Tibet Today,” Students for a Free Tibet, 
http://www.studentsforafreetibet.org/section.php?id=27 (accessed Mar. 9, 2011);  Goldstein, The Snow Lion 
and the Dragon, xi. 
9 A. Tom Grunfeld, The Making of Modern Tibet, rev. ed. (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), 5. 
4 
 
 
Volume 2: The Calm Before the Storm, 1951-1955, Tibet scholar and translator Matthew 
Akester took issue with Goldstein’s usage of the term “liberation” as normative, among other 
points, which launched a disagreeable debate between the two10.  There is no avoiding 
potentially contentious terms, but emotionally neutral terms are used whenever possible.  
One should note that the term “invasion” is impartial.  For the purposes of the following, 
references to Tibetan nationalism before 1959 refer to the Tibetan government in Lhasa’s 
belief that Tibet was an independent, sovereign nation and that it held authority over 
ethnographic Tibet.  Different transliteration conventions for both Chinese and Tibetan also 
pose difficulties.  With regards to Chinese, names and places are presented using the pinyin 
system without tonal markings, except in the case of Hong Kong, familiar names such as Dr. 
Sun Yat-sen, and citations and quotations, which remain unaltered.  There is no universally 
accepted phonetic transliteration system for the Tibetan language.  Although the Wylie 
romanization convention transcribes written Tibetan faithfully, it uses groups of 
unpronounced consonants and therefore does not give a non-Tibetan speaker any clue as to a 
word’s pronunciation.  For that reason, Tibetan names appear in familiar romanized forms 
without diacritical marks.  Finally, for the purposes of the following, “Tibet” refers to 
political Tibet unless specified otherwise.  
Part 1: Tibet in the Post-War Press 
 The specter of Communism haunted news headlines from China following victory 
over Japan in August 1945.  Americans went to newsstands and witnessed the United States 
                                                 
10 Matthew Akester, “Review of A History of Modern Tibet, Volume 2: The Calm before the Storm, 1951-1955 
by Melvyn C. Goldstein,” The Journal of the International Association of Tibet Studies [JIATS], no. 4 (Dec. 
2008): http://www.thlib.org/collections/texts/jiats/#jiats=/04/rev_goldstein/ (accessed Mar. 13, 2011); 
Melvyn C. Goldstein, “Goldstein's Response to M. Akester's 'Review of A History of Modern Tibet, Volume 
2: The Calm before the Storm, 1951-1955 by Melvyn C. Goldstein,” JIATS, no. 5 (Dec. 2009): 
http://www.thlib.org/collections/texts/jiats/#jiats=/05/rej_goldstein/ (accessed Mar. 13, 2011).  
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(US) gradually “lose” China to Communism.  City by city, province by province, American 
ally Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi) lost ground after the Chinese Civil War 
renewed in 1946, despite General George Marshall’s best efforts to form a coalition 
government following Japan’s surrender.  During the Second World War, Japan was 
America’s enemy, but the post-war settlement of China posed a greater challenge to US 
policymakers11, and the Chinese Civil War’s resumption threatened to undo the US 
government’s plans for China to play a decisive role in Asia.  Americans picked up their 
copy of the New York Times on June 21, 1948 and read that official sources confirmed that 
Communist forces had captured Kaifeng, one-time ancient capital of China and then capital 
of Henan province12.  Shenyang followed in October, signaling Communist takeover of 
Manchuria.  An editorial subsequently declared the Soviet Union (USSR) was guilty of 
betraying its obligations under the Yalta agreement to return Manchuria to the Chinese 
Nationalist government and support it morally and militarily.  While what the editorialist 
called a “Russian Fifth Column” – the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) – continued its war 
of liberation in a “determined Russian drive13,” American attention was focused in Europe. 
 Three days after the New York Times reported Kaifeng’s fall, its readers learned of the 
USSR’s response to the introduction of a new Deutsche Mark (thereby economically 
isolating Soviet-controlled East Germany) when it cut all ground access to West Berlin and 
shut off half of its electricity14.  By the Berlin Blockade’s end in May 1949, Tianjin, Beijing, 
and even the Republic of China’s (ROC) capital, Nanjing, were in Communist hands as 
                                                 
11 Xiaoyuan Liu, A Partnership for Disorder: China, the United States, and Their Policies for the Postwar 
Disposition of the Japanese Empire, 1941-1945 (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 7. 
12 “Kaifeng Captured by Communists,” New York Times [NYT], Jun. 21, 1948, 14. 
13 “The Fall of Mukden,” NYT, Nov. 1, 1948, 22. 
14 Drew Middleton, “Russians Bar Food to Western Berlin in Currency Fight,” NYT, Jun. 24, 1948, 1, 19.           
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Communist forces pushed deep into southern China.  On October 1, 1949, “the nominal 
leader of the Chinese Communists, Mao Tze-tung, who will fill that role as long as he is 
amenable to the Kremlin’s instructions,” pronounced the PRC’s establishment.  While an 
editorialist denounced the PRC’s inauguration as a “farce15,” several thousand kilometers 
away the Tibetan government in Lhasa grew increasingly nervous faced with the possibility 
of imminent “liberation.”    
 With other international issues dominating news media attention and the situation 
within Tibet still peaceful, Tibet appeared in print only irregularly with almost no discussion 
of the Tibet Question.  Before 1950, American journalists acquainted their readers with 
events in Tibet, but a good deal of exoticism and paternalism peppered the coverage.  For 
instance, as Lhasa prepared for the young, four-and-a-half-year-old Fourteenth Dalai Lama’s 
coronation in 1940, an article in Time magazine portrayed Lhasa as “a dirty, disagreeable 
town” where either the British or Chinese were responsible for what little modern 
improvements existed.  Tibetan women, according to the same article, were among the 
ugliest in the world while Tibetans of both sexes suffered an estimated ninety-nine percent 
venereal disease rate, doubtlessly the result of all the manners of sexual perversion that 
Tibetans practiced16.  Tibet was more of a curiosity in the news rather than an international 
issue.   Along with seeing advertisements for “fabled fleeces” from such far away places as 
Persia, Peru, and Tibet on sale at Saks Fifth Avenue17, Americans filled-in their New York 
Times crossword puzzles with answers such as “Lhasa” (20 Down, “Capital of Tibet”)18 and 
read reports of savage Tibetan tribesmen possibly enslaving American airmen who survived 
                                                 
15 “Red Rule in Peiping,” NYT, Oct. 2, 1949, E8. 
16 “Kokonor Kid,” Time, vol. 35 (Feb. 26, 1940), 53. 
17 Saks Fifth Avenue, “Sun and Snow Whites by Strock,” NYT, Feb. 4, 1947, 8. 
18 Louis Baron, “Puzzles: Here, There, Everywhere,” NYT, Mar 31, 1946, 118. 
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crash landing in southeastern Tibet while flying over “the Hump” carrying supplies from 
British-controlled India to Nationalist forces in Chongqing during the Second World War19.   
I 
 New York Times coverage of the 1948 Tibetan Trade Mission to the US epitomized 
American journalistic conversation of Tibet from 1945 to 1949.  On August 11, 1948, five 
Tibetans wearing the latest in American men’s summer fashion assembled on the sixtieth 
floor of the Empire State Building.  There they gave an interview to fourteen New York 
news reporters and described plans to develop direct trade relations with the US.  According 
to an unnamed New York Times reporter, “The press representatives fortified with hastily 
gleaned reference book data, began in serious vein,” but the questions they asked turned from 
matters of the estimated two million dollars worth of trade between the US and Tibet to the 
less serious: “Was it true that even the poorest Tibetans were decked out in gold nuggets?  
What are yak tails used for, and is it true that they are good material for Santa Clause 
whiskers?  What kinds of American foods did the visitors like?” and the inevitable, “Had 
Tibetans seen ‘Lost Horizon’20?”  The New York reporters obviously thought that their 
readers would be more interested in the spectacle of the Tibetans themselves rather than the 
miniscule amount of trade between Tibet and the US or prospects for increased trade. 
 With the aid of an interpreter, the smiling head of the delegation, Tibetan Finance 
Minister Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa21, indicated that he enjoyed American food.  Although he 
had not seen the 1937 film adaptation of James Hilton’s novel Lost Horizon, he was 
apparently familiar with the term “Shangri-La” from Americans repeatedly asking him the 
                                                 
19 “Americans Reported Enslaved in Tibet,” NYT, Feb. 22, 1946, 10. 
20 “5 From Tibet Here to Drum Up Trade,” NYT, Aug. 12, 1948, 43.  Italics added. 
21 “Tsepon” was Wangchuck Deden Shakabpa's title as one of the four lay heads of the Tibetan Revenue 
Office.  He was often described in news media as “Tibet's Finance Minister.”   
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same question.  The American public followed the curious story of Tibet’s first mission to 
the US, whose ostensible goal was securing American customers and dollars for Tibetan 
exports ranging from wool to yak tails.  However, the Tibetans also wanted to be treated as 
a formal foreign delegation and the American public was unaware of the delicate diplomatic 
situation the delegation caused.  All that Americans could glean of it from the New York 
Times coverage of the 1948 Tibetan Trade Mission was that the delegates claimed that Tibet 
was no longer a Chinese dependency, but the reference books with which the New York Times 
reporter had fortified himself stated otherwise22.     
 The Trade Mission’s purpose was first, to purchase gold to back up Tibet’s paper 
currency and second, to gain access to foreign currency23.  To that extent, it succeeded; the 
Tibetans secured $400,000 in gold and the right to both import goods through Calcutta, India 
duty free and keep American dollars from exports24.  It was not successful, however, in 
being formally treated as a delegation from a sovereign state.  Although the five Tibetans 
believed they traveled to the US using Tibetan passports25, the US State Department actually 
regarded them as passports issued by a foreign government that the US government did not 
recognize26.  The ROC protested the very idea of a Tibetan mission from the start, saying 
that the Tibetan government officials had no authority to negotiate with a foreign country, no 
right to travel without Chinese passports, and demanded to know under what circumstances 
the US issued the delegation visas and whether or not the US had changed its “usual attitude 
                                                 
22 “5 From Tibet Here to Drum Up Trade,” NYT, Aug. 12, 1948, 43. 
23 Melvyn C. Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, 1913-1951: The Demise of the Lamaist State (Berkeley & 
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989), 571. 
24 Grunfeld, The Making of Modern Tibet, 91. 
25 Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, Tibet: A Political History (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1967), 295. 
26 US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, vol. VII, The Far East: China 
(Washington D. C.: US Government Printing Office, 1972), 604. (Cited hereafter as FRUS followed by the 
appropriate year, volume, and page numbers) 
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toward Tibet.”  When the US nevertheless granted the Mission visas, it afterward informed 
the ROC that their issuance did not constitute formal recognition of Tibet and the US retained 
its stance that Tibet was a part of China27.  In effect, the US officially regarded the Tibetan 
Trade Mission as unofficial.  When the Tibetans wanted to meet with President Harry 
Truman and deliver letters and gifts from the Dalai Lama and his cabinet, the Kashag, the 
ROC insisted its Ambassador to the US, V. K. Wellington Koo (Gu Weijun), be present.  At 
this the Tibetans balked, but the US still wanted to extend every courtesy and so the Tibetans 
instead met with Secretary of State George Marshall as consolation (Marshall became 
Secretary of State in early 1947).  Even though the US government was willing to deal with 
Tibet as if it were an independent state when the moment required, as it did when hosting the 
1948 Tibetan Trade Mission, the US still officially maintained that Tibet was a part of China 
and the American press represented it no differently. 
 American journalists were simply not interested in discussing the Tibet Question 
before 1950.  Tibet was exotic, and occasionally newsworthy for that fact alone, but the 
American press portrayed Tibet as part of the American-allied ROC with little analysis when 
the opportunity presented itself.  Journalists certainly missed opportunities when the 1948 
Tibetan Trade Mission visited New York City.  They missed another perfect opportunity 
when the Tibetan government expelled the ROC mission in Lhasa – the ROC’s token 
expression of authority – in what the New York Times described as a “revolt against China28.”  
The newspaper’s initial reports suggested it was a Communist-inspired revolt, but the New 
York Times eventually explained that the Tibetan government was worried about Communist 
                                                 
27 FRUS, 1948, vol. VII, The Far East: China, 759-760.  
28 “Revolt against China is Reported in Tibet,” NYT, Jul. 23, 1949, 1. 
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infiltration among the mission’s disaffected members29.  Indeed, Lhasa was full of spies, 
both Nationalist and Communist, and the Tibetan government, anxious from news of 
Communist successes to the east, summoned the head of the ROC Mission on July 8, 1949 to 
inform him that he had two weeks to leave.  The Tibetan government also expelled anyone 
else suspected of being a spy30.  All that the New York Times initially had to say about 
Tibet’s status vis-à-vis China was that the ROC claimed sovereignty over Tibet31, but then 
later explained, “China for years has maintained a small mission in Lhasa to signify legal 
sovereignty, never exercised in practice, over the country ruled by Buddhist priests in the 
name of the Dalai Lama, currently a teen-aged boy32.” 
II 
 The worlds of celebrity and politics then strangely merged when news broke that a 
horse had thrown Lowell Thomas, famous American reporter, broadcaster, and writer, while 
traveling through Tibet.  Perhaps best known for his sensational coverage of T.E. Lawrence 
(“Lawrence of Arabia”) the fifty-seven-year-old intrepid world traveler seriously injured 
himself in late September 1949 as he and his son, Lowell Thomas Jr., returned to India from 
Lhasa through the Karo Pass, south of Gyantse33.  Limping on crutches, he returned to the 
US with tales of his stay in Lhasa, his meeting with the Dalai Lama, his death-defying 
survival after breaking his leg, and the fear gripping the religious, monarchical government 
of Tibet – that Tibet’s ancient religion and customs would soon come to an end.  “Tibet,” 
Thomas said during an interview on board the American rescue plane sent from the US 
                                                 
29 “India to Sift Tibet Rumor,” NYT, Jul. 24, 1949, 24; “Tibet Revolt Explained,” NYT, Jul. 25, 1949, 5. 
30 Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, 1913-1951, 611-612.  
31 “India to Sift Tibet Rumor,” NYT, Jul. 24, 1949, 24. 
32  “Tibet Revolt Explained,” NYT , Jul. 25, 1949, 5. 
33 “Lowell Thomas Thrown by Horse in Himalayas,” NYT, Sep. 24, 1949, 5.                        
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Embassy in New Dehli, “is the most anti-Communist country in the world34.”  By accident, 
Tibet found its first celebrity spokesperson and advocate.  Stepping off of the plane at La 
Guardia airport in New York City, Thomas immediately spoke of the US giving the Tibetans 
guerrilla training and modern weapons, “which would make it more difficult for the Chinese 
Communists to approach on the North,” as well as establishing a US mission in Lhasa.  He 
also carried with him parchment and verbal messages from the Dalai Lama and his regent to 
Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson35.  Thomas, as a well-established reporter and 
broadcaster, had the American press’ ear and the American public’s by extension.  
According to Thomas, “all Tibetans regarded their isolated land as entirely sovereign and 
separate from China despite that country’s claim to some sort of suzerainty36.”   
 After Mao Zedong proclaimed the PRC’s establishment in October 1949, he also 
stated that the CCP had not yet finished the task of liberating China.  Despite vast 
ideological differences, both the CCP and Chinese Nationalist Party (GMD) regarded Tibet 
as an integral part of China.  However, the Tibetan government in Lhasa disagreed.  
Although no foreign government ever recognized Tibet as a sovereign nation, after the Qing 
dynasty’s collapse in 1912 and the Thirteenth Dalai Lama afterward expelled all Chinese 
troops and officials, the Tibetan government exercised de facto independence without 
interference from either Yuan Shikai, briefly President of the ROC in the early 1910’s, or 
Jiang, who took over leadership of the GMD following Sun Yat-sen’s (Sun Zhongshan’s) 
death in 192537.  The ROC never exercised any practical power inside Tibet where it 
                                                 
34 Robert Trumbull, “Tibet Fears Told by Lowell Thomas,” NYT, Oct. 11, 1949, 21. 
35 “Lowell Thomas Back from Tibet,” NYT, Oct. 17, 1949, 25. 
36 Robert Trumbull, “Tibet Fears Told by Lowell Thomas,” NYT, Oct. 11, 1949, 21. 
37 Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon, 30, 34, 36. 
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claimed authority, but the PRC was determined to change the status quo.  Unlike the ROC, 
the new Communist government had the means as well as the will. 
III 
 Before late 1949, Tibet did not have much relevance to journalistic discussion of the 
Cold War, the dominant international news story during the 1945-1949 period.  That began 
to change when Americans read that the CCP vowed, shortly before the PRC’s founding, to 
“liberate all Chinese territory, including Tibet, Sinkiang, Hainan Island and Taiwan 
(Formosa) and will not permit a single inch of territory to remain outside the rule of the 
Chinese People’s Republic38.”  Tibet then joined the American news cycle with news 
coverage of Thomas’ escapade, on which the New York Times published regularly, catalyzing 
American interest in what was previously a mysterious, exotic, remote corner of the world.  
Although Thomas established the precedent of American celebrities campaigning for Tibetan 
nationalism, American sympathy for the Tibetan nationalist cause did not yet emerge so long 
as the Sino-Tibetan status quo remained unthreatened.   
Part 2: Invasion to Liberation, 1950-1951 
 At the beginning of 1950, the PRC publicly reiterated its intention to liberate Tibet39.  
In October, the PRC demonstrated that it would fulfill that intention by force if Lhasa did not 
peacefully negotiate Tibet’s integration with China.  After the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) crossed the Sino-Tibetan border in the first week of October and defeated the 
                                                 
38 “Chinese Reds Promise the ‘Liberation’ of Tibet,” NYT, Sep. 3, 1949, 5. 
39 Robert W. Ford, Captured in Tibet, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1990), 1; Harrison E. 
Salisbury, “Soviet Backs Mao on Formosa Claim, Press Also Maintains Hainan, Tibet Are Part of China – 
Cites 1943 Cairo Accord” NYT, Jan. 5, 1950, 19.  The declaration came in a New Year's announcement, 
which also mentioned Taiwan and Hainan.  Radio operator Robert Ford was the first Tibetan government 
official to hear the announcement.   
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outnumbered, poorly trained, and ineptly-led Tibetan army at Qamdo, the PLA halted40.  
Militarily unifying Tibet with the “Chinese motherland” and “expelling imperialists who 
sought to keep Tibet separate” was actually the PRC’s last resort.  There was nothing 
stopping the PLA from continuing straight to Lhasa, but Chairman Mao believed that the best 
way the PRC could integrate Tibet required Lhasa’s participation41.  The PLA even released 
three officials captured at Qamdo to facilitate talks.  Lhasa had been in diplomatic contact 
with Beijing since the beginning of 1950, but refused to send representatives to negotiate on 
Beijing’s terms.  Instead, the Tibetan government hoped to delay the PRC as long as 
possible in effort to attract foreign assistance from the US, the United Kingdom (UK), India, 
or the United Nations (UN)42.  Lhasa had little choice but to finally send delegates to 
Beijing when its appeal to the UN failed.  On May 23, 1951, Tibet’s delegates signed the 
Seventeen Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet.       
 Contemporaneous to the PRC’s invasion and unification of Tibet, the Korean People’s 
Army (KPA) of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) crossed the 38th 
parallel to unify the peninsula on June 25, 1950.  Although Korea was of no strategic value 
to the US militarily, and even though both General Douglas MacArthur in December 1949 
and Acheson in January 1950 had put it outside of the US defense perimeter in the Pacific, it 
was of utmost importance politically, if only as a substitute for a seemingly failed American 
effort in China.  Korea was a symbol of American commitment to contain Communism and 
                                                 
40 Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon, 45; Shakya, The Dragon in the Land of Snows, 32.  There is 
some confusion regarding the actual date of the PLA's invasion.  Goldstein puts the invasion's beginning on 
October 7 whereas Shakya puts October 6. “Qamdo” is also frequently romanized as “Chamdo.”  
41 Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon, 44. 
42 Ibid., 41-46 
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protect its allies43.  The US led the UN Command to repulse the KPA in what Truman 
officially labeled a “police action44.” After UN forces held on to their foothold at Pusan 
through summer 1950, outmaneuvered the KPA at Inchon beginning September 15, and 
pushed the front lines beyond the 38th parallel in October, the PRC then overtly intervened 
nearly simultaneously as it invaded Tibet.  In the American public’s mind, the Korean War 
and invasion of Tibet were not only related, but also signaled a new era of Communist 
expansionism in Asia.  
 Throughout 1950 and into 1951, a series of events pushed Tibet into the American 
news cycle: Sino-Tibetan negotiations, the invasion of Tibet, the Tibetan appeal to the UN, 
the Dalai Lama’s flight to Yadong near the border with Sikkim, and the ultimate signing of 
the Seventeen Point Agreement all caused American news media to discuss the Tibet 
Question.  Meanwhile, the Dalai Lama became something of a celebrity as the press tracked 
his flight from Lhasa as well as his eventual return.  During the 1950-1951 period, Tibet’s 
isolation and underdevelopment affected the way journalists reported the news from inside 
Tibet, and not typically for the better.  Journalists were not privy to details of international 
diplomacy and, as a consequence, the American public only caught a glimpse of the Tibet 
Question’s nuances.  Tibet emerged from the 1950-1951 period as a symbol of Communist 
aggression and a part of world-wide Communist expansion during an era of fear concerning 
Soviet intent, but unlike other areas of the world, American public interest in Tibet developed 
independently of government involvement.  
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I 
 In the beginning of 1950, Americans looked to the Asian front of the Cold War with 
uneasiness.  Even mysterious, exotic, and remote Tibet became a front in the Cold War 
against Communism’s expansion within the American psyche.  A January 23 editorial 
article in the New York Times spelled out American trepidations before Korea became an 
international crisis: 
Current indications of expansionist aims on the part of the Chinese 
Communists naturally cause increasing uneasiness in all neighboring 
countries.  It has long been established that Moscow is committed to a 
program of Communist revolutions in Southeast Asia, but just how far the 
Chinese Communists will be the military instruments of such a program has 
not been determined.   
 
The editorial focused on French Indo-China as “the most sensitive spot” of anticipated 
Communist expansion.  The article also mentioned Thailand and Tibet as targets and the 
writer hypothesized that Red China might expand into Tibet and Southeast Asia as 
compensation for deferring to the USSR in the north45.  The editorial came at a time when 
Americans were still digesting their “loss” of China.  New York Times foreign 
correspondent, first female member of the newspaper’s editorial staff, and Pulitzer Prize 
winner Anne O’Hare McCormick asked in another editorial, “What will we do next in 
Asia46?” In a fateful address to the National Press Club in Washington D. C. on January 12, 
1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson publicly addressed the question “What is the 
situation in regard to the military security of the Pacific area and what is our policy in regard 
to it?”  In his remarks, Acheson described a perimeter for US national defense that ran from 
the Aleutian Islands, through Japan and its Ryukyu Islands, and down to the Philippines.  
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Critically, Acheson did not included Korea, Taiwan, or any other location on or near the East 
Asian mainland in his statement.  Tibet was not an issue because it was beyond US 
strategic interests in the Pacific region.  To many Americans, it seemed as if his answer to 
American commitment on the Asian continent was non-commitment.  Republicans in 
Congress were already fuming at Acheson for being soft on Communism and refusing to 
send aid to Jiang’s regime on Taiwan.  At the end of the address to the National Press Club, 
someone asked “why the Republican leaders are so intent on intervening in the hopeless 
China situation when they opposed the Truman plan for Europe[?],” to which Acheson 
answered, “one of the sound rules of ancient justice was that the wise thing for a court to do 
was to observe the limits of its jurisdiction47.”  Acheson refused to bait the Truman 
administration’s Republican opponents, but if Americans thought that he also refused to give 
a definite policy towards the defense of other areas of Pacific Asia, they failed to understand 
his words’ significance at the time:   
So far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is concerned, it must 
be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack.  But 
it must be clear that such a guarantee is hardly sensible or necessary within the 
realm of practical relationship.  Should such an attack occur – one hesitates 
to say where such an armed attack could come from – the initial reliance must 
be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the 
entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations which so far has 
not proved a weak reed to lean on by any people who are determined to 
protect their independence against aggression48. 
 
The manner in which the American press portrayed the USSR as intrinsically 
belligerent continued from the late 1940’s in the aftermath of the Truman Doctrine, the 
Berlin Blockade and Airlift, and the Marshall Plan throughout the 1950-1951 period.  The 
                                                 
47 Walter H. Waggoner, “Four Areas Listed,” NYT, Jan. 13, 1950, 1. 
48 “Remarks by Dean Acheson before the National Press Club, ca. 1950,” 2; Harry S. Truman Administration; 
Elsey Papers; Harry S. Truman Library & Museum.  Italics added for emphasis 
17 
 
 
idea that the USSR and its “puppets” were constantly seeking to expand corresponded with 
Truman’s own perception that Communism was analogous to the Axis Powers of the Second 
World War49.  Within that rationale, Tibet seemed like just another one of Moscow’s targets.  
Another editorial article at the beginning of 1950 concerned Afghanistan and Tibet.  Calling 
Tibet “ripe for the plucking by Chinese Communists,” the editorial highlighted fear of 
Communist expansion in Central Asia that would then spill over into “chaotic, bankrupt 
Burma, to endangered Indo-China, to bandit-ridden Malaya, to the birthpangs of the new 
United States of Indonesia.  But all roads lead to Moscow these days; the problems really 
boil down to one problem – Soviet Communist expansionism50.”   
 At the time, Americans still considered the PRC as another Soviet satellite doing 
Moscow’s will.  The New York Times pointed out the link between Soviet and “Red 
Chinese” expansionism into Tibet when it forwarded Trud newspapers’ statement that “Now 
the hour of final liberation of Tibet is not far off51.”  This Soviet talk of liberating Tibet 
stemmed from Premier Zhou Enlai’s visit to Moscow to conclude a Sino-Soviet alliance in 
early 195052.  According to C. L. Sulzberger, then chief foreign correspondent for the New 
York Times, winner of a special Pulitzer Prize citation in 1951, later a prolific writer of books 
on US foreign policy, and member of the family that owned the newspaper53, Moscow sought 
expansion into Asia while the US focused on Europe.  Sulzberger described thirteen 
coordinated techniques that the Soviet Union used to satiate its imperialist desires in Asia, 
such as war and skillful diplomacy in the case of the Sakhalin and Kurile Islands, political 
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seizure of leadership of nationalist movements as in Vietnam, and “Efforts to induce 
paralysis by implied force as exemplified by the warnings to Tibet that it should yield to 
Peiping.” Sulzberger also explained that the USSR avoided areas too strong to easily 
succumb to pressure – Finland, Yugoslavia, Turkey – and left weak areas – Afghanistan, 
South Korea – alone because they would always be “available54.”  
 Also at the beginning of 1950, the Red Scare and the era of McCarthyism began after 
Americans learned that their enemy had apparently infiltrated their own government.   In 
late January, a jury convicted Alger Hiss, a former respected US State Department official of 
ten years and head of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, of two counts of 
perjury for lying to a Congressional committee.  Hiss denied under oath that he ever passed 
secret documents to a known Communist spy, Whitaker Chambers, or that he had contact 
with him during the time in question.  Hiss escaped charges of treason and espionage only 
because of a three-year statute of limitations55.  The confession of a British scientist named 
Klaus Fuchs that he passed atomic secrets to the USSR followed the very next month.  The 
New York Times published a portion of the confession read in court, which showed that Fuchs 
was a Marxist sympathizer and possibly mentally ill56.  The very next day after the New 
York Times published Fuchs’ confession, it reported that a hitherto little-known junior 
Republican senator from Wisconsin named Joseph McCarthy had a list of fifty-seven 
Communists known to the government and still working in the US State Department57.  
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Without any proof at all and for personal political gain, he began a brief reign of terror that 
today bears his name. 
II 
 Coverage of Sino-Tibetan negotiations to resolve the Tibet Question under a 
perceived threat of Communist expansionism began serious journalistic discussion of Tibet.  
In January 1950, negotiations between Lhasa and Beijing commenced.  The Tibetan 
government made the first move to initiate discussions with the PRC over Tibet’s status vis-
à-vis China58, but the American public heard about the Lhasa-Beijing negotiations differently.  
The New York Times reported that the “Reds” demanded Tibet send a delegation to Beijing 
without delay to submit peacefully, or else59.  Not long after, the New York Times published 
an article on a PRC radio broadcast which stated the Chinese people “will not tolerate it...if 
Lhasa authorities obstinately stick to their errors and continue to submit themselves to 
American imperialism,” and then offering “appropriate regional autonomy” to Tibetans60.  
In actuality, both sides were eager to non-violently resolve the Tibet Question and the Tibetan 
government appointed Shakabpa to head a delegation to negotiate with the PRC, which 
departed in February.  The Tibetan Foreign Bureau fatefully issued each delegate member a 
Tibetan passport, just as the Foreign Bureau had done with the previous 1948 Tibetan Trade 
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Mission61.  At the same time, another Tibetan mission to the US, the UK, India, and Nepal 
seeking foreign assistance fell apart when neither the US nor the UK proved receptive62.   
 Unlike the 1948 Tibetan Trade Mission to the US, the 1950 delegation received a 
good deal of American press coverage, probably because of the perceived Communist threat 
to Tibet, a non-Communist “country.”  On May 23, 1950, Americans read New York Times 
Hong Kong correspondent Walter Sullivan’s article about an English language broadcast 
from Beijing that began with the PRC’s offer of peaceful liberation and regional autonomy to 
the Dalai Lama.  The broadcast also contained a thinly veiled threat which urged the Dalai 
Lama and Tibetans to prevent “unnecessary losses” and not to rely on either British or 
American imperialists for aid.  Tibet’s rough terrain and isolation were allegedly no obstacle 
because both the Long March and Hainan’s recent liberation demonstrated that nothing was 
out of the PLA’s reach.  The broadcast was both an invitation and a warning.  Beijing radio 
assured Tibetans that the PRC respected minority nationality people’s rights, including the 
freedom of religion, and cited the good treatment that Tibetans and Tibetan monasteries were 
receiving in PRC-controlled territory.  At the same time, the PRC knew that Tibet was 
seeking foreign assistance from its enemies.  Sullivan, then a foreign correspondent for the 
New York Times who later became the newspaper’s science news editor and the first journalist 
to receive the Public Service Medal of the National Academy of Sciences63, noted in his 
report on the broadcast that “Only last Sunday the Dalai Lama’s brother, Gyalo Thondup, 
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conferred with Chiang Kai-shek in Formosa, presumably on the future of Tibet64.” By the 
time the American public read Sullivan’s report on the May 23 broadcast, the Tibetan 
delegation had been in India for a month and the PRC was eager to resolve the Tibet 
Question promptly.   
The English language broadcast from Beijing was actually a rebroadcast of a May 6 
message by Geshe Sherab Gyatso, who was then Vice-Chairman of the newly established 
Qinghai provincial government.  His participation was part of the PRC’s strategy to utilize 
Tibetans, especially such religious figures as himself and the Panchen Lama, to assure the 
Tibetan government and Tibetans themselves that the PRC respected religious freedom.  
What made the broadcast that Sullivan covered different from the one that the New York 
Times reported on in January was that the earlier message explicitly threatened the Tibetan 
government with force for the first time.  In hindsight, it was perhaps the PRC’s final 
warning65.   
 However, the Tibetan government remained unconvinced and the PRC’s tactic of 
implied force played out in the American press as just part of a coordinated Soviet strategy of 
imperialism and expansion in Asia66.  The reason Beijing radio decided to rebroadcast the 
May 6 message in English is unknown.  Presumably, the PRC wanted to demonstrate that it 
had a legitimate interest in Tibet because the PRC, like the ROC, claimed Tibet as a part of 
China.  In any case, the American public was unaware of the Tibetan government’s role in 
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initiating negotiations.  From early coverage of the Sino-Tibetan negotiations, Americans 
understood that the Communist PRC was trying to bully non-Communist Tibet into 
submission.    
 Just as the 1948 Tibetan Trade Mission caused a diplomatic row over Tibet’s status, 
the 1950 delegation raised the same complication when Tibetan officials again attempted to 
travel with Tibetan passports.  However, this time the American press caught part of the 
controversy and pushed it into journalistic discussion.  Although the PRC invited the 
Tibetan delegation to Beijing to peacefully discuss Tibet’s status with regards to China, the 
Tibetans instead wanted to meet on neutral ground, such as in British-controlled Hong Kong.  
The Tibetans were due in Hong Kong to meet with a PRC representative on June 5, 1950.  
However, on June 6 the New York Times reported the surprising news that Indian police 
stopped the Tibetans from boarding a plane from Calcutta to Hong Kong because they did 
not have the proper visas67.  The delegation then found itself stuck in India without 
acceptable travel documents to continue its mission and the American public followed their 
travails.   
 Even though much of the diplomatic controversy remained behind the scenes, out of 
public view, the argument over the Tibetans’ passports provoked better coverage and insight 
into the heart of the matter: the Tibet Question.  Following the story, former New York Times 
war correspondent turned foreign correspondent Robert Trumbull, who later wrote almost a 
dozen books on Asia and the Pacific68, reported from New Delhi that the British canceled the 
Tibetans’ visas because they worried that the delegates would “hand over Tibet to the 
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Communists on a silver platter.” The British also did not want the crown colony of Hong 
Kong to facilitate such a development.  They suggested to the Tibetans that they wait for 
Beijing’s Ambassador to India to arrive, negotiate with him, and leave their colony, which 
was situated precariously next to the PRC, out of the whole affair69.   
 Trumbull’s article accurately described much of the controversy to its audience, but 
lacked key details behind the British Foreign Office’s decision to prevent the Tibetan 
delegation from traveling to Hong Kong.  This was not a case of faulty reporting because 
such details rested in the diplomatic correspondence between all the sides involved.  Before 
the Tibetan delegation arrived in India in early April, Lhasa asked the Indian government to 
issue its delegates diplomatic visas.  The Indians then turned around and asked the British70.  
Just as Trumbull’s article stated, the British Foreign Office was worried about the result of 
possible Sino-Tibetan negotiations.  Discussing whether or not to grant the Tibetan 
delegation diplomatic passports, one Foreign Office Far East Department official doubted 
that anything good could come from it.  He predicted as soon as Communist troops entered 
Tibet, the PRC would disregard anything signed on paper.  The same official also pointed 
out that if Hong Kong hosted talks, the UK would become open to further accusations of 
imperialism – that Tibet was merely a British puppet state (although he suggested Singapore 
as a venue rather than Hong Kong).  Critically, he argued that because the UK did not 
recognize Tibet as an independent state, but also not as a part of China, either, the Tibetans 
should not receive visas on Tibetan or Chinese passports.  Another Foreign Office official 
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disagreed, responding that because the PRC’s takeover of Tibet was inevitable, the UK 
should at least try to allow for peaceful negotiations rather than cause futile bloodshed71.   
 Whereas the diplomatic wrangling around the 1948 Tibetan Trade Mission produced 
no visible controversy in American newspapers, the 1950 Tibetan delegation helped push the 
question of Tibet’s status into public view.  Although Trumbull did not have all the details, 
he summarized the Tibet Question to his audience while following the delegation’s story 
saying, “The ‘nominal suzerainty’ of China over Tibet is recognized by numerous foreign 
powers, but not by the Tibetans themselves72.” The root of the problem implicitly emerged 
from press coverage of the visa controversy: no foreign nation recognized the passports the 
delegation carried because no foreign nation recognized Tibet as an independent state (but 
not entirely dependent, either).  By the time the British Foreign Office finally concluded it 
would not stamp visas on the Tibetans’ passports, the Tibetan delegation had already made 
travel plans to Hong Kong where a PRC representative waited and probably intended to 
guide the Tibetans to Beijing.  However, due to a miscommunication the West Bengal 
government in India nevertheless stamped the Tibetan passports73.  When the UK canceled 
the visas, stranding the delegates in India, a multi-lateral exchange between the UK, India, 
and the Tibetan delegation ensued.  Each side countered the others’ suggestions for the 
Sino-Tibetan negotiation’s venue.  Meanwhile, the governors of Hong Kong and Singapore 
objected to hosting the Tibetan delegates in their colonies and the Tibetans grew impatient.  
They tried to impress upon the other parties their mission’s urgency because they were 
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receiving reports of fighting in eastern Tibet74.  Regardless, they had to accept the idea of 
negotiating with the PRC’s ambassador to India after he was due to arrive in late August 
195075.    
 Diplomatically speaking, the UK was stuck between a rock and a hard place.  If it 
recognized the Tibetan passports, it would signal to the PRC that the UK recognized Tibet as 
a sovereign nation at a time when the UK was trying to mend fences with the new 
Communist government.  Issuing visas on the passports also might have implied that the 
UK supported Tibet’s claim of independence.  On the other hand, if the UK refused the 
Tibetan delegation travel documentation, then the Foreign Office believed it might hasten 
Tibet’s doom by not allowing peaceful talks.  In the end, the 1950 Tibetan delegation never 
made it to Hong Kong. 
 The delegation waited until September 16 to meet with Ambassador Yuan Zhongxian, 
who rejected any notion of Tibetan independence.  He gave the delegation three points to 
especially consider from the Common Program of the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference: first, Lhasa must accept that Tibet is part of the PRC; second, 
Lhasa must accept the PRC’s responsibility for national defense; third, Lhasa must accept the 
PRC’s responsibility for trade and international relations.  Shakabpa forwarded the three 
points to the Tibetan government with his recommendation that it accept the PRC’s proposal 
with modifications to be discussed later.  However, Lhasa rejected the very idea and still 
clung to the hope that outside assistance would save Tibet.  Both Shakabpa and the PRC 
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later publicly blamed the UK for the invasion of Tibet by not granting the Tibetan delegation 
visas76.  
III 
 While the Tibetan delegation remained in India, to the American public it appeared 
the PRC was preparing to strike regardless of negotiations.  Reports slowly filtered in 
saying that Communist forces were already inside Tibet.  As early as March 1950, a nine 
hundred man PLA force reportedly took control of a Tibetan village on the Sino-Kashmiri 
border77.  Later in July, the New York Times forwarded reports from Taiwan that quoted 
“well-informed sources” who stated that twenty thousand troops under Peng Dehuai’s First 
Field Army had crossed into Tibet from Xinjiang78.  The report’s origin was sketchy and 
both the Indian government and the Tibetan delegation stuck in India denied the report.       
 Reports that the PRC was intensifying preparations to invade Tibet were accurate on 
many accounts.  The PRC initially adopted a conciliatory stance towards Tibet and utilized 
Tibetan members of what New York Times correspondent Henry R. Lieberman called “the 
Communist fold” to its advantage, such as Tibetan youth and political workers79.  The CCP 
had a small Tibetan membership on which it was quick to capitalize.  These Tibetans were 
from areas beyond Lhasa’s control in eastern or ethnographic Tibet.  Included among them 
were long-time members whom the CCP recruited when it crossed into ethnically Tibetan 
areas during the Long March.  Most were poor or nationalistic, or both, who found the 
CCP’s message of a unified and prosperous Tibet appealing.  Others, such as the Geta 
Rimpoche of Beri Monastery in the Tibetan province of Kham chose the side that they 
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believed would win.  Still, the number of Tibetans in “the Communist fold” was few80.  
Coverage of the PRC’s preparations became typical of reporting of events inside Tibet in 
general – inconsistent, reliant on sketchy, unconfirmed reports – but the American public had 
good reason to trust Lieberman’s article.  As a veteran reporter who covered the Chinese 
Civil War and later became the New York Times science news editor, Lieberman wrote his 
article shortly after returning from a fellowship at the Council on Foreign Relations81.  
Sometimes the American public read pieces of good journalism, but sometimes not.  
 Tibet’s geographical isolation and technological underdevelopment lubricated the 
rumor mill that produced a flurry of reports on the PLA’s invasion.  Looking back, the 
American press jumped the gun many times by mistaking all of the movement, activity, and 
even shooting along the border for the actual invasion that it perceived and reported as 
inevitable.  By the time the New York Times reported that two PLA columns were marching 
toward Tibet from the east and northeast, there were skirmishes along the poorly-defined 
Sino-Tibetan border as the PLA probed Qamdo’s defenses82.  The day after Americans 
learned that the PLA was moving on Tibet, they read that the Indian government discounted 
the report coming out of Hong Kong83; the Indian government had received no word of the 
impending invasion.  In retrospect, no one should have put much confidence in the burst of 
reports alleging, then discounting, an invasion of Tibet.  There were no Western reporters in 
Tibet and any news that Western reporters in Hong Kong, Kalimpong, New Delhi, Calcutta, 
or even Kashmir relayed to the US had to do so from locations hundreds of kilometers 
removed from the scene of action.  Tibet had no modern roads, only a few radio 
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transmitters, and only one telegraph link to the outside world.  Even though the Indian 
government maintained a (the) telegraph link to Lhasa, the Tibetan army laid in wait at 
Qamdo to defend the gateway into central Tibet.  Qamdo was much farther away from 
Lhasa than the approximately seven hundred kilometer distance as the crow flies owing to 
the fact that no modern transportation network connected the two through daunting terrain.  
(Today, a 1,200 kilometer highway connects the two84.)  News did not often travel fast in 
Tibet.   
 American press coverage of what would become known as the “Peaceful Liberation 
of Tibet” suffered for want of detail, confirmation, or even veracity because of geographic 
and technological limitations, but also due to the sources on which journalists had to rely. 
The Tibetan government did maintain radio contact with its army at Qamdo (British 
technicians Robert Ford and Reginald Fox operated the radio link), but even though Tibetan 
and PLA forces engaged in skirmishes just outside the Tibetan fortress town back in May, 
American reporters had very little to say about the hostilities other than they were receiving 
reports of clashes.  During his coverage of the 1950 Tibetan delegation in June, Trumbull 
could only say that a correspondent for the New Delhi and Calcutta Statesman heard reports 
of skirmishes from travelers85, which was technically hearsay.  In late September, the New 
York Times again reported violence in eastern Tibet, apparently relying on fleeing Tibetan 
travelers and officials for the information86.  However, the article from Calcutta cited 
sources in distant Kalimpong, key Indian-Tibetan entrepôt near modern-day Bangladesh.  
That is, the newspaper still relied on third parties to do its reporting.  By that time, Lhasa 
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had rejected Shakabpa’s recommendation that it accept the PRC’s terms in principal and his 
request to proceed to Beijing for further negotiations87.  
 An article in Time magazine published in November 1950 summarized the problems 
of reliable sources: “In the month that Tibet has been under Chinese Red attack, much of the 
news from the roof of the world has come from yak-drivers, muleteers and porters.  Their 
hearsay and gossip, picked up at Kalimpong, India’s gateway to Tibet, became grist for a 
notable rumor mill that had Lhasa lost, the Dalai Lama in flight, his army destroyed, his 
lamaseries in turmoil88.” Without any journalists in Tibet, witnessing events firsthand, the 
American public only received news from Tibet by way of sources whose stories were often 
not verifiable.  At first, Lieberman noticed that even the usually active CCP propaganda 
machine had little to say about the PRC’s move into Tibet.  The earliest Beijing radio 
announcement that PLA troops were “advancing toward Tibet” was not made in either the 
PRC’s name or its Chairman’s, which was atypical.  Lieberman also noted that neither 
Beijing radio nor “Hong Kong’s pro-Communist newspapers,” Da Gong Bao and Wen Hui 
Bao, had anything to say about Tibet since that announcement89.  For lack of the PRC’s side 
of the story, journalists covering Tibet had to rely on what they could glean from traders, 
pilgrims, travelers, and Tibetans fleeing the conflict, as well as any diplomatic official willing 
to talk.  It was not until October 31 that the Indian government finally officially confirmed 
the PLA’s maneuver into Tibet.  By way of its representative in Lhasa, the only accredited 
representative of a foreign nation in Tibet’s capital, India confirmed that PLA troops were 
roughly 320 kilometers east of Lhasa occupying the strategically critical town of Lho dzong, 
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among others, west of Qamdo.  Trumbull quoted [British?] Foreign Office officials who 
said that the PLA could have been in Lhasa in two weeks if it force marched its troops90.    
IV 
 The Tibetan appeal to the UN pushed an already active journalistic conversation of 
Tibet even further.  Faced with an enemy it could not defeat on the battlefield, the Tibetan 
government turned to the UN in vain hope that foreign intervention would protect Tibet 
against the PRC.  In the first week of November 1950, Time reported how rumors swirled 
that pro-Communist monks had overthrown the Dalai Lama in a coup d’état when the only 
radio transmitter based in Lhasa went silent.  A week later, the transmitter came to life 
broadcasting that the mood in Tibet had deteriorated and Time speculated that the Dalai Lama 
and his regent had three options: (1) flee to India; (2) resist the PLA; (3) make a deal with the 
PRC91.  Apparently, the Tibetan government believed that it still had a fourth option when it 
sent an appeal to Lake Success by way of Shakabpa in India.  Whether or not Tibet could 
actually appeal to the UN became the Tibetan complaint of aggression’s first hurdle.  Even 
before the complaint reached the UN, Tibet’s legalistic status as officially a “half-dependent 
state,” “protectorate,” or “suzerainty” reportedly bewildered the delegates and officials of the 
UN Secretariat.  However, an unnamed New York Times reporter wrote that common 
consent was that “the details of the relationship between Tibet and China are by now lost in 
historical obscurity92.” When the Tibetan complaint of aggression actually reached the UN on 
November 13, it was still unclear if the issue could even be considered.  Tibet, after all, was 
not a member of the UN.  The second subsection of the thirty-fifth article of the UN Charter 
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reads: “A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the 
Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in 
advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the 
present Charter93.” The UN Secretariat had no background in Tibet’s status, was unable to 
determine whether or not Tibet constituted a “state,” and was at first only willing to 
informally distribute the Tibetan complaint of aggression to the UN’s member nations.  
Without a member nation to sponsor the Tibetan appeal, it would have been dead on arrival, 
categorized as just another communication from a non-governmental organization94.  
Without El Salvador, the American public would not have received deeper insight into the 
Tibet Question’s complications.  
 When El Salvador proposed forwarding the Tibet issue to the General Assembly 
without first going through the General Committee on November 15, the tiny nation in 
Central America not only surprised its fellow members at the UN, it also forced complicated 
details of the Tibet Question before world and American eyes.  Unlike coverage of the 1950 
Tibetan delegation, this time the press explicitly reported on how the parties involved were 
all reluctant to act because of questions regarding Tibet’s status either as an independent 
state, a Chinese dependency, or something of a de facto independent state in between.  The 
New York Times published the entire text of the Tibetan complaint of Chinese aggression sent 
by the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan Cabinet, and the Tibetan National Assembly, the Tsongdu, the 
day after it arrived.  The complaint appealed to the UN to intercede and restrain alleged 
Chinese Communist aggression while laying out the case that Tibet was racially, culturally, 
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geographically, and historically not a part of China, but a sovereign state95.  However, a 
New York Times article published on the same day as the Tibetan appeal and a page turn away 
pointed out that no nation was then willing to raise Tibet’s case before the Security Council.  
The article continued, saying that despite the Tibetan assertion that China had no special 
position in Tibet, most of the great powers disagreed and noted that the ROC, of course, 
claimed suzerainty over it96.  El Salvador’s demand that the General Assembly debate the 
issue without first going through the fourteen-member General Committee, which was 
normal procedure, thus came as a shock a day later.  (There is no evidence that the US used 
El Salvador as a proxy for its interests.  Rather, El Salvador sponsored the Tibetan appeal at 
Pope Pius XII’s request97.)    
 No other nation wanted to touch the issue.  As was becoming normal procedure of 
reporting about Tibet, news articles repeatedly stated that no other nation regarded it as a 
completely independent state.  There were other complications.  If the UN took up 
consideration of the Tibetan appeal, it “might make any practical dealing with Peiping almost 
impossible,” according to New York Times reporter and later Pulitzer Prize winning journalist 
Abraham Michael “A. M.” Rosenthal98.  Contemporaneous to the Tibetan appeal was, of 
course, the Korean War, and Tibet seemed just a distraction from a more critical issue in the 
Far East.  At this time, the UN was struggling with the issue of Chinese representation at 
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Lake Success and resolving the Korean conflict certainly required Beijing’s participation 
after it entered on the side of its Communist ally; there was simply little the UN could do for 
either Tibet or Korea as long as the PRC remained absent amongst its membership.  In late 
November, “volunteers” from the PRC appeared in large numbers in northern Korea and the 
conflict threatened to expand beyond the peninsula.  (Only later did the UN designate the 
PRC as an aggressor in Korea on February 1, 1951 with of vote of forty-four to seven and 
nine abstentions99.)  Finally, although the US, the UK, and the UN in general all looked to 
India to lead on the Tibet matter, New Delhi was hesitant to do anything to jeopardize 
relations with Beijing.  The idea of the UN intervening it what most of the world regarded 
as an internal affair also hit too close to home.  In 1948, India objected to the UN taking up 
the controversy over India absorbing the princely state of Hyderabad by force when the 
Nizam of Hyderabad declined to join either India or Pakistan100.      
 It came as no surprise when the UN General committee voted to shelve discussion of 
Tibet indefinitely on November 24, the same day Americans went to their newsstands and 
read how MacArthur began a general offensive that he believed would end the Korean 
War101.  The chief reason behind the decision stemmed from India’s insistence that a 
peaceful resolution to the violence could yet be reached between the PRC and Tibet.  
Following Tibet’s appeal to the UN, Rosenthal quoted India’s delegate, Lieutenant General 
His Highness Maharaja Jam Sri Sir Digvijaysinhji Ranjitsinhji Jadeja, Maharaja Jam Sahib of 
Nawanagar, as stating, “In the Peiping Government’s latest note to India the People’s 
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Republic of China said that it had not given up hope of a peaceful settlement102.”  Although 
the UK wanted to support Tibet with a possible UN condemnation of the PRC’s actions, it 
hoped that the UN would not demand the PRC withdraw its forces and restore the Sino-
Tibetan status quo, “which would at best be likely to lead to a resolution which China would 
defy and which could only be enforced by armed action which neither we, nor we assume 
India or anyone else, e.g., the United States, would be prepared to take.  In the result the 
United Nations would lose prestige103.”  Neither the UK nor India was confident about 
Tibet’s status amidst the international community, but the UK decided to follow India’s lead.  
The US was also sympathetic, but also deferred to India.  Although the invasion of Tibet 
stung Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru – the New York Times published his weak rebuke of 
the PRC in the form a letter of “deep regret” over the invasion, to which Beijing responded 
harshly as outside interference in “the domestic problem of China” – he did not want to 
jeopardize relations with the PRC.  A second note to Beijing stated that India hoped “that 
the Chinese government will still prefer the method of peaceful negotiation and settlement to 
a solution under duress and force104.     
 The controversy in the UN over the Tibetan appeal combined with the invasion to put 
the Tibet Question in a new light on an international stage for American readers.  Tibet truly 
became a newsworthy topic.  As a result, longer, in-depth analysis of Tibet, its history, and 
the reasons behind the invasion emerged here and there in the American press to bring the 
American public up to speed.  The Foreign Policy Bulletin, published by the Foreign Policy 
Association, a non-government organization dedicated to raising awareness of international 
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questions that affect the US, concluded that the PRC’s action disturbed relations with India, 
but also stated, “Whether [the invasion] represents a compact between Moscow and Peiping 
to extend Communist domination throughout Asia or merely the attempt of Chinese leaders 
to consolidate and safeguard control over their national territory cannot as yet be 
determined.” Its coverage of the roots of the PRC’s decision to invade Tibet dove into Sino-
Tibetan relations during the Qing dynasty (A. D. 1644-1911), the split between the rival 
Dalai and Panchen Lamas, and possible cleavage between Beijing and New Delhi105.  A 
similar, but less academic, analysis appeared in the New York Times at roughly the same time 
with added emphasis on Tibetan culture, religion, polygamy and polyandry, and not a tiny bit 
of exoticism.  The article concluded with:  
In spite of [the Tibetan desire to be secluded], and whatever the outcome of 
the conflict in Asia, Tibet can no longer maintain complete seclusion.  As the 
Red cloud gathers above the Himalayas, many minds in Tibet must now be 
concentrated on an integral precept of their faith which teaches them that 
Gyalwa Chamba (The Loving One) will, at the chosen time, emerge from the 
West to save mankind.  Expectant Tibetan eyes seem to be looking to the 
West for a sign106.   
 
Indeed, the Tibetan government expected help from abroad, but nothing from its efforts to 
solicit aid materialized anything more than headlines. 
V 
 While its appeal played out in the UN, the Tibetan government hedged its bets by 
pursuing its other two choices: flight to India and making a deal with the PRC.  The Dalai 
Lama then emerged as a sort of celebrity when Americans began to watch his every move, 
starting with his assumption of power and flight to Yadong near the Indian-Tibetan border.  
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On November 17, 1950, the New York Times reported that the Dalai Lama was to assume full 
ruling powers a year-and-a-half before schedule in effort to end the political dissension 
within Tibetan government circles107.  The Dalai Lama took control of his government after 
the Tibetan Cabinet and National Assembly accepted the two state oracles’ prophecies that 
the safety of Tibet’s people and religion rested with the then sixteen-year-old boy.  The New 
York Times article showed remarkable insight into the political situation in Lhasa at the time, 
considering all of the aforementioned limitations that journalists faced reporting on events in 
Tibet.  The article correctly mentioned the political tension within Lhasa that followed the 
PRC’s military expedition into eastern Tibet.  The threat of the PRC’s invasion paralyzed 
the Tibetan government’s ability to act because the government was still fractious and 
weakened from the Reting Rimpoche’s conspiracy to overthrow the Dalai Lama’s regent in 
1947.  Some within the government wanted to compromise with the PRC, others refused 
any consideration.  The Dalai Lama’s assumption of power was a victory for the political 
faction in Lhasa that resisted compromise on Tibet’s de facto independence.  This faction 
ordered Shakabpa to send an appeal for help to the UN108. 
 The New York Times reported on December 1 that the Dalai Lama was preparing to 
flee to India as the PLA in eastern Tibet sat poised to march on Lhasa.  Even though the 
Tibetan government had been developing a secret plan to whisk the Dalai Lama to Yadong, 
approximately twenty-four kilometers away from Sikkim, the tell-tale signs leaked and 
wound-up printed in a newspaper.  A New York Times article reported that a mule caravan 
carrying 5,200 pounds of gold belonging to the Tibetan government crossed into Sikkim 
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while some of the Dalai Lama’s closest advisers made arrangements for accommodations in 
Kalimpong109.  Six days after the fact, the New York Times printed its report that the Dalai 
Lama had fled for India on December 20.  Later, the newspaper ran a story saying the Dalai 
Lama planned to install a new capital at Yadong where he and his government could observe 
the reported PLA offensive to Lhasa and Shigatse, which never occurred110.  Although the 
Tibetan government received word from Shakabpa that the India government was willing to 
help the Dalai Lama should he need to cross the border, Trumbull reported from New Delhi 
news to the contrary: India was wary of granting sanctuary to the Dalai Lama and reportedly 
advised him to stay in Tibet until the threat to himself was more imminent111.  The Dalai 
Lama’s situation itself, not just Tibet’s, became a focus of news media attention and the 
American public finally got word that the boy god-king was safe in Yadong when he arrived 
on January 2, 1951 led by “A procession of monks blowing long copper trumpets and and 
[sic] carrying sacred banners and incense burners...to the monastery situated on a hill 
overlooking the wide magnificent Lingmathang plain.” The story of the boy god-king made 
for good press in part because it fit into Tibet’s Lost Horizon romantic image112. 
VI 
 Signs of Sino-Tibetan cooperation dampened American interest in Tibet leading up to 
and following the Seventeen Point Agreement’s signing.  Two days before the UN General 
Committee killed the Tibetan appeal, a three man Tibetan delegation reportedly left Lhasa to 
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personally press Tibet’s complaint of aggression.  Even after the UN shelved discussion at 
India’s suggestion, El Salvador continued its role as Tibet’s champion and the Tibetan 
delegation to the UN continued its mission to Lake Success undaunted113.  However, neither 
the American press nor the UN entertained interest of another Tibetan delegation in another 
appeal for foreign assistance.  Although the Truman administration was gaining interest and 
reformulating its policy towards Tibet, the unknowing Tibetan government-almost-in-exile 
debated its next course of action.  All that the American public knew of the tense 
discussions at Yadong was that the Dalai Lama reportedly directed his Cabinet to speed up 
efforts in the UN before he left for the Dungkar Monastery just a little ways up the Chumbi 
Valley114.   
The Dalai Lama decided to remain in Tibet under pressure from members of his own 
government and the heads of the three largest and most powerful monasteries in Tibet: Sera, 
Drepung, and Ganden.  Based on his diplomatic experience, Shakabpa also testified at 
Yadong that no foreign power would be willing to help either Tibet or the Dalai Lama in 
exile.  Furthermore, the UN never invited the Tibetan delegation to come to Lake Success 
for a second appeal.  In late January 1951, two Tibetan officials paid Ambassador Yuan a 
visit to inform him that the Tibetan government was ready and willing for serious talks.  
The Tibetan government appointed two officials among themselves at Yadong to go to 
Beijing.  It also sent a telegram to Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, former governor of Kham and 
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leader of the Tibetan army at Qamdo, whom the PRC captured and released, instructing him 
and two other officials at Qamdo to proceed to Beijing as well115.      
 The New York Times published the Tibetan delegation to the UN’s claim at Kalimpong 
that Tibetans would fight a guerrilla war against the PRC indefinitely116, but it was not too 
long before a headline spelled out, “Dalai Lama Seeks Red China’s Terms: Leaves Aides in 
Tibet Capital to Talk, Will Return There if Peiping is Reasonable117.” After reading the news 
in the first few weeks of January 1951, the American public might have concluded that 
months after the PLA demonstrated Tibet’s military impotence, the Tibetan government was 
still trying to keep all of its options on the table.  While the Dalai Lama remained a day’s 
journey away from the Indian border, the Tibetan government was simultaneously 
dispatching a negotiating team to Beijing.   
Coverage of the events leading up to and including the Seventeen Point Agreement’s 
signing was very matter-of-fact.  Journalists reported in early March that the Tibetan 
delegation to Beijing was only a formality because the Tibetan Government and the PRC had 
already come to an agreement.  Under the agreement, Tibet would reportedly be to the PRC 
what the princely states were to India.  In other words, Tibet would control its internal 
affairs while Beijing would control its defense and foreign affairs118.  It therefore must have 
come as little surprise that the New York Times reported that Tibet accepted suzerainty under 
the PRC when Beijing radio reported that the PRC successfully achieved the peaceful 
liberation of Tibet.  Lieberman reported that Beijing agreed to maintain Tibet’s political and 
religious institutions and its officials, provided they cut “pro-imperialist and pro-
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Kuomintang” ties.  Also under the Agreement, the Tibetans themselves would carry out 
“reforms.”  Meanwhile, the Tibetan government agreed to restore the Panchen Lama to his 
position, integrate its army into the PLA, allow Beijing control of its foreign relations and 
national defense, and, of course, unite with China to expel imperialist influence119.  From 
what Americans knew of Tibet’s status as an anomalous suzerainty under China from 
coverage of previous events, Lieberman’s audience might have believed that very little 
actually changed.   
  Although the New York Times reported that the Dalai Lama considered repudiating 
the Seventeen Point Agreement in July, that he asked for modification of terms in October, 
and only finally signed the treaty after a five month delay on October 27, neither the 
American press nor public had any idea of the drama amidst the Seventeen Point 
Agreement’s signing120.  When the two Tibetan officials from Yadong met up with Ngabo at 
Qamdo, they gave him a letter authorizing him to negotiate with the PRC.  The letter also 
told him to insist on Tibetan independence and the removal of PLA troops from Tibet.  
Ngabo thought these orders were ludicrous and never carried them out.  Ngabo received 
further instructions that reiterated the two previous points when both sides agreed to hold 
discussions in Beijing, but the instructions also named him as the head representative and 
told him to refer all important points back to the Tibetan government for consultation.  
Ngabo did not actually possess the authority to sign any document without consulting the 
Tibetan government, but did so anyways because he feared what the PRC might do if he did 
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not121.  Although Ngabo had the seal of the governorship of Kham on his person, he and the 
rest of the delegation did not sign with any official seal, merely seals bearing their own 
names.  (Tibetan nationalists later claimed that the PRC fashioned forged seals with which 
the delegates signed the treaty.)  However, none of the delegates had the legal ability to sign 
the treaty and only affixed their proper names in no official capacity to the document122.  
The news of the Seventeen Point Agreement came as a shock to the Dalai Lama and his 
government123, but at that point, the PRC’s “liberation” of Tibet became a fait accompli.  
Despite what Americans heard from the press, the PRC forced Tibet to accept its sovereignty 
as an integral part of China under the Seventeen Point Agreement’s stipulations.  
VII  
 Significantly, US government involvement did not shape the American journalistic 
conversation of Tibet because neither American news reporters nor their readers were aware 
of the extent of US foreign policy toward Tibet.  Everyday Americans were even unaware 
that the US sought to lend the Tibetan government in Lhasa material aid against their 
common enemy.  Although the US government wanted to aid Tibet in its global war on 
Communism just prior to the Korean War’s outbreak, neither the UK nor India shared that 
desire.  The UK was not interested in encouraging Tibetan resistance to “Commie control” 
and advised the US to refrain from intervening publicly, saying “Tibetan collapse would have 
more serious effect in neighboring countries if [the] issue were played up in advance124.” As 
inheritor of British interests in Tibet, India also wanted nothing to do with the US proposal to 
secretly extend Tibet arms and financing beyond the weapons India already sold to Tibet in 
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early 1950.  In a possible case of precognition, Americans read in May 1950 that India 
denied a Soviet accusation that it secretly allowed the US to transport arms to Tibet125.  
Stuck in India, the Tibetan delegation made good use of its time by staying in contact with 
US Ambassador to India Loy Henderson beginning in June.  The US State Department then 
concocted a plan to have the Tibetans approach New Delhi with a request to allow them to 
purchase additional arms without informing the Indians who would supply them.  Shakabpa 
wanted American troops and planes, but the US, with limited military capability, was only 
willing to provide war material and finance.  Ultimately, secret US-Tibet negotiations 
proved fruitless.  India publicly recognized Tibet as a Chinese suzerainty and in the 
invasion of Tibet’s immediate wake the Nepalese Ambassador to India informed Henderson 
that India was apparently “washing its hands of Tibet.” Without India’s participation, or at 
least acquiescence to allow the US and Tibet to transport arms across Indian soil, Henderson 
considered the question of aiding Tibet dead126.  The US government’s silence on American 
foreign policy toward Tibet was therefore no accident.     
 American interest in Tibet is remarkable compared to areas in Asia in which the US 
government was intimately involved.  A world map published next to a New York Times 
article about the Western European response to the Korean War’s outbreak contained the 
caption: “Communist Pressures As World Asks: What Next127?” Months after Acheson spoke 
of US policy in the Far East, Americans still wanted an answer and followed their 
government’s involvement overseas.  Americans were ignorant of the National Security 
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Council’s (NSC) conclusion on the eve of the Korean War in the original draft of NSC 68/1, 
called “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,” that the US lacked the 
military capabilities to directly challenge the USSR politically and diplomatically.  Without 
sufficient military capabilities reflecting a dramatic increase in defense spending, the NSC 
regarded the American policy of containment as a bluff128.  Naturally, Americans watched 
UN “police work” in Korea, but beginning in 1947, Americans also witnessed the Truman 
administration shift from politically reforming occupied Japanese society, so that Japanese 
militarism would never again threaten the US, to economic reconstruction in order to build-
up Japan as a bulwark against the USSR and the PRC.  From the Korean War’s outbreak to 
1954, the US bought nearly three billion dollars of Japanese goods and services for the war 
effort129.  Hansen W. Baldwin, Pulitzer Prize winning New York Times military reporter, 
outlined Japan’s strategic position for the US in an article on June 25, 1950.  The title read, 
“Ten Strategic Factors in Tokyo Treaty Talks,” with the subtitle, “Japan Would Play an 
Important Part in Any Conflict with Russia130.”  Just as American public attention followed 
government involvement in Japan, so too did Americans follow the progression of 
government involvement in Southeast Asia, French Indo-China in particular.  After Acheson 
publicly announced that the US would grant France and the Indo-China states of Vietnam, 
Laos, and Cambodia aid against Communism in Paris on May 8, 1950, a New York Times 
editorial article appeared the next day to illustrate French Indo-China’s importance: 
Indo-China occupies a critically strategic position.  It borders Thailand, 
Burma and South China.  It is a gateway to Malaya, as the Japanese 
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demonstrated.  It flanks the Philippines.  It is a big arch in the bridge to 
Indonesia.  If it falls to the Communist advance the whole of Southeast Asia 
will be in mortal peril....If Indo-China is to have a chance for eventual 
freedom, and if Southeast Asia is to be preserved, the Communist threat must 
be met131. 
 
French Indo-China was strategically valuable not just for its natural resources, geographic 
location, and marketplace for Japanese or American goods, but also for the perceived effect 
its loss to Communism would have upon surrounding nations.  It was a matter of dogma in 
Washington that if Indo-China succumbed to Communist expansion, its neighbors would 
subsequently fall like dominoes.  1950 marked the beginning of American government 
involvement in Indo-China132 and it naturally drew the American public’s attention.  From 
Tokyo to Saigon, the Truman administration drove journalistic discussion of every nation 
with which the US was formally and strategically involved. 
 Although American public interest in Tibet developed independently of government 
involvement, that interest was codependent on Cold War conflict.  During the 1950-1951 
period, Tibet was just one, small part Americans’ fear of the expanding Red Menace.  In an 
article listing “Communist pressure points” around the world following the Korean War’s 
outbreak and the invasion of Tibet, New York Times war correspondent Foster Hailey 
described Korea as the focus point of Communist aggression along the Cold War’s 7,100 
mile front line.  Tibet was only a footnote in Hailey’s article compared to Indo-China, 
Burma, Germany, and even Iran.  Maps like the one included with the article were 
extremely typical of any discussion of Communist expansion and appeared regularly.  Tibet 
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was always listed as an object of potential or realized Communist pressure133, but the Cold 
War’s focus was elsewhere.  McCormick explained in another editorial that American 
interest in Tibet stemmed from its proximity to India.  The rumors at the time “that the 
greedy vanguards of the new imperialism are concentrating on that strange and primitive 
state [Tibet]” made for good news and certainly caught American attention, but Tibet itself 
seemed unimportant next to larger, more pressing issues elsewhere134.  Another editorial 
article published not long afterward touched on the legal question of Tibet’s status, but 
overwhelmingly focused on Tibet’s strategic location as a potential springboard for 
Communist movement into Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, and India135.  A further editorial, 
entitled “The Curtain Falls in Tibet,” came after news of the Seventeen Point Agreement’s 
signing on May 28, 1951.  The editorial began with “another bastion has been taken by 
communism; another vacuum filled by Communist expansionism” and then stated towards 
the end, “this is a defeat for the West, although a minor one.  Its chief danger is that it brings 
the Communists right down on India’s border....Another buffer has disappeared, and when 
one thinks of the danger on the other side to Iran – historically a buffer state linking India 
and the West – there is cause for anxiety over what has happened to Tibet136.” 
VIII 
 Beginning in 1950, American journalists began to transform American interest in 
Tibet into sympathy with their news coverage.  In Americans’ imagination, Tibet was a 
victim of Communist aggression, plain and simple.  The Foreign Policy Bulletin’s 
assessment that the PRC might have been only seeking to consolidate control of its national 
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territory was an outlier in a crowd.  Without US government input into the journalistic 
conversation of the Tibet Question or knowledge of government involvement, American 
news reporters overwhelmingly portrayed the invasion of Tibet as a compact between the 
PRC and USSR to extend Communist domination throughout Asia.  From this journalistic 
conversation came the antecedents of American sympathy for the Tibetan nationalist 
principles that Tibet was an independent country before the PRC’s invasion and that the PRC 
did not peacefully liberate Tibet, but illegally conquered it.  American reporters had little 
knowledge of the diplomatic wranglings behind the scenes over Tibet’s legal status and the 
legal nuances of the Tibet Question, which reportedly bewildered even the UN, evaporated in 
this context.  Whether or not the English language rebroadcast of the PRC’s offer of 
autonomy to the Dalai Lama and Tibetans was a plea for Beijing’s case that Tibet was a part 
of China, to Americans the case was moot because they considered the PRC as an outgrowth 
of the USSR and an illegal Communist regime.  Still, there was only so much space on a 
newspaper’s front page and more pressing international hot spots in the Cold War choked 
journalistic discussion of the Tibet Question during this time.    
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Part 3: Interlude, 1951-1954 
 From the time the PLA arrived in Lhasa in August 1951, the PRC military 
administration in Tibet and the Tibetan government coexisted in a tense relationship.  After 
arm twisting on both sides, the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government finally formally 
ratified the Seventeen Point Agreement in October 1951, five months after the Tibetan 
delegation in Beijing had signed it137.  Although the PLA authorities adhered to a strict code 
of behavior designed to avoid antagonizing Tibetans by respecting Tibetan culture and 
religion, while liberally paying for anything they needed, they found putting theory into 
practice difficult.  The PLA’s very presence provoked hostility as thousands of PLA troops 
strained Tibet’s subsistence economy to the breaking point and inflated commodity prices.  
Even though the PRC administration left society in Tibet intact during the 1951-1954 period, 
threatening neither aristocratic nor monastic privilege, PRC authorities met determined 
Tibetan resistance to their policies, which economic difficulties exacerbated.  The two 
acting prime ministers of the Tibetan government defied the PRC’s integration of Tibet at 
every opportunity and became champions of anti-Chinese sentiment.  When the PRC 
administration forced the Dalai Lama to ask the two acting prime ministers to resign in April 
1952, the PRC momentarily quashed Tibetan resistance138.  The PRC’s integration of Tibet 
dovetailed with its campaign to modernize Tibet with roads, bridges, factories, power 
generation facilities, schools, clinics, cinemas, and so on.  By the end of 1954, the PRC 
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secured its position in Tibet and began to gain Tibetan trust through its modernization 
efforts139.    
Coverage of events in Tibet steadily dropped after the Seventeen Point Agreement’s 
signing in American news media, reaching a nadir in 1953.  However, the American public 
could still walk to their newsstands to keep abreast of developments behind the Bamboo 
Curtain.  Through Lieberman’s reporting of the establishment of a Tibetan Autonomous 
Region in Xikang back in December 1950, Americans became aware of Mao’s adaptation of 
his own “new democracy” with Josef Stalin’s approach to the “nationalities problem.”  
Lieberman wrote that the Western Xikang Tibetan Autonomous Region’s government was 
quite socially diverse, according to the PRC’s official announcement, and included “seven 
abbots and Living Buddhas, nine local chieftains, an ‘industrialist’, and even a member of the 
local ‘gentry’140.” It was no accident that the Tibetan Autonomous Region in Western 
Xikang’s government contained so many members of the Tibetan elite.  Mao believed that 
he needed to slowly win-over the top of Tibetan society in order to successfully integrate the 
Tibetan population into a multi-ethnic state141.  In 1953, the PRC scored a crucial victory 
when it concluded the 1953 Sino-Indian Trade Agreement by which the first non-Communist 
power recognized Tibet as a part of China, rather than a suzerainty.  Despite the Bamboo 
Curtain and waning attention, the American press covered many aspects of the PRC’s efforts 
to modernize and integrate Tibet.      
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I 
 Interestingly, the American public suffered from no lack of information about road 
building in Tibet after the Seventeen Point Agreement’s signing.  The New York Times 
provided its audience with a steady stream of reports that followed the PRC’s progress of 
linking Tibet to the rest of China with a modern transportation system.  On April 6, 1951, 
the New York Times reported that the PRC had completed a motor road linking Yushu in 
Qinghai province to Qamdo142.  Almost seven months after the PRC invaded Tibet, it finally 
had a road capable of bearing motorized traffic to the first major Tibetan town it “liberated.”  
If the PRC was to have any chance of holding onto its gains in Tibet and supply the PLA in 
Lhasa and on the frontier, it desperately needed modern highways for a supply chain that 
would stretch hundreds, even thousands, of kilometers.  Later in August, the New York 
Times reported that 100,000 Tibetans and [presumably Han] Chinese from Yunnan province 
were building a road to Lhasa from eastern Tibet.  A very brief blurb subsequently reported 
that the PRC had announced its plan to build a road from Lhasa to Burang, the commercial 
center in western Tibet on the Tibetan-Indian-Nepalese border143.  The need for good roads 
throughout Tibet’s rugged terrain revealed itself over time: the PLA’s presence in Tibet 
strained Tibet’s ability to feed the extra thousands of troops beyond its means. 
However, highways did not open for vehicle traffic all the way between Lhasa and 
Xikang and between Lhasa and Qinghai until 1954144, while another highway connecting 
Lhasa to Xinjiang remained under construction.  The New York Times reported in October 
1951 that the PRC planned to build two airfields outside of Lhasa, but did not give a reason 
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why the PRC was reportedly so interested in the airfield plans that Austrian engineer Peter 
Aufsnaiter designed while working for the Tibetan government145.  Without anything more 
than mountain trails designed for yak or mule caravans, the PLA required food so badly that 
it looked to airlifting supplies.  Trumbull reported in November that the Dalai Lama and his 
government approved airlifting food to Lhasa, but another report came out later in January 
1951 that said strong winds prevented the first plane from bringing supplies from Qamdo to 
Lhasa.  Meanwhile, PLA troops in Shigatse resorted to looting and eating food normally 
reserved for animal fodder146.  Another reason the PRC needed motor roads emerged in the 
New York Times; the terrain in Tibet was so rough that PLA troops were wearing out their 
footwear.  At the equivalent to $6.72 a pair, shoemakers in Kalimpong reportedly received 
an order for ten thousand pairs of knee-length leather boots for PLA soldiers across the 
border147. 
From airfields to motor roads, the American public kept itself up to date on the PRC’s 
progress to modernize Tibet’s transportation network.  One brief blurb said, “Ancient Tibet 
for the first time is to have wheeled traffic, which has been barred for centuries.  The 
Chinese Communists, who now run the country, are reported constructing carts to be drawn 
by animals or laborers to facilitate the distribution of rice and other supplies to their 
occupation troops148.” Article after article in the New York Times described new PRC efforts 
to speed road construction or announcements of progress: “Thousands Building Road From 
Red China to Tibet” in November 1952, “Tibet Building Highway” in August 1953, “Red 
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China Speeds Tibet Road” in January 1954, “China-Tibet Highway Pushed” in October 1954, 
and many more ad nauseam149.  Almost all of the coverage of road building in Tibet 
consisted of very short blurbs, typically no more than a few dozen words.  Most of the 
reports on the transportation difficulties that the PRC faced in Tibet were short and dry with 
an occasional oddity, such as a report that the PRC was sending 2,000 camels to Tibet “to 
ease the desperate transport problems of [the PRC’s] estimated 20,000 troops150.”   Either it 
was a slow day for the New York Times editors and they just needed to fill page space, or, far 
more likely, any banal news about Tibet trumped banal news from anywhere else.  Still, the 
American public definitely knew that the PRC was making progress in its efforts to 
physically integrate Tibet; on February 3, 1953, the New York Times reported that Beijing 
newspapers were reaching Lhasa in only ten days151.  
 More developed journalism covered the PRC’s other efforts to modernize and 
physically integrate Tibet.  Americans apparently took issue with the PRC’s modernization 
efforts because developments kept appearing in print.  Before the PRC’s head representative 
in Tibet, General Zhang Jingwu, even reached the Dalai Lama at Yadong on July 14, 1951, 
Senator Alexander Wily, the senior Republican from Wisconsin, grilled Acheson before the 
Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees absurdly stating that the Soviets 
were building airplanes only three hundred miles from New Delhi in Tibet152.  No one was 
building airplanes in Tibet, but this was not the first time that Americans received word of 
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dubious journalistic merit that the Soviets had designs in Tibet.  Back in November 1950, 
Trumbull began a series of news articles on a Soviet plan – “obtained by extraordinary 
intelligence work, the details of which cannot be revealed” – of establishing air bases in 
western Tibet to extend Soviet domination153.  Thomas helped break Trumbull’s story of the 
supposed Soviet plot in Tibet with his popular radio broadcasts154.  Newsweek revealed that 
Trumbull’s extraordinary intelligence work amounted to paying a thousand dollars to an 
informant for the information155.  (Trumbull later told Grunfeld that a “British Himalayan 
enthusiast and Tibetophile” approached him and sold the story for two thousand dollars.)   
 Although there was no hard evidence that the Soviets ever surveyed airfields or 
minerals in Tibet at the time156, Americans saw the Red Menace in the PRC’s modernization 
and integration plans.  On June 13, 1951, the New York Times forwarded a Xinhua 
announcement that a mission composed of geologists, meteorologists, agriculturalists, 
language and social science specialists, and other scientists would be sent to “survey 
conditions preparatory to carrying out reforms.” The article concluded with “it seemed 
obvious from the composition of the mission that mineral and other resources would be 
explored and that its membership was sufficiently large and varied to encompass most major 
branches of the investigation, including strategic military aspects157.”  An editorial in 
August 1952 took the news of railroad expansion in China’s northwest and the creation of 
three minority autonomous regions as a Soviet plot: 
A second look at the situation and at the map is worth taking. Three 
“autonomous” regions were suggested, Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Sinkiang.  
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All three are contiguous with the Soviet Union and thus join in the rough 
category of other “autonomous” areas, such as the Trans-Khingan area...and 
the much earlier absorbed areas  of Tannu Tuva and Outer Mongolia....The 
obvious inference  is that the pattern will be followed  and that Tibet, 
Sinkiang and eventually Inner Mongolia will play their part in the Soviet 
Union’s fragmentation of mainland China....It is now two years since 
Secretary Acheson declared that the Soviet Union’s policy on the Asiatic 
mainland was one of “attachment” of bordering areas.  The currently 
reported developments are a part of that process of attachment. 
 
 Anything the PRC did to integrate and modernize Tibet seemed threatening to 
Americans because of the supposed Moscow-Beijing link and Tibet’s position overlooking 
India.  Mao planned on using Tibet’s unexploited mineral wealth to develop the entire 
PRC158, reportedly with the help of Soviet technicians, engineers, and mining experts159.  
By the time the New York Times reported that Czech engineers were en route to Lhasa to help 
construct airstrips, roads, and bridges, as well as assist fifty Chinese scientists prospecting for 
minerals, a coal mine had already begun operation, which helped ease a fuel shortage160.  
Tibet contained (then and still does now) valuable mineral deposits, from gold and iron to 
borax and uranium161.  Unfortunately for the PRC, it needed to allocate a lot of time a 
resources to extract Tibet’s mineral wealth right as the PRC was about to undergo the Great 
Leap Forward. 
II 
 Although it was relatively easy for American journalists to report on the PRC’s efforts 
to modernize Tibet, it was difficult for them to obtain a clear picture of Sino-Tibetan politics.  
Whereas the sources on which American journalists relied for information beyond the 
                                                 
158 Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, Vol. 2, 518.  
159 “Modern Tibet Planned,” NYT, Apr. 2, 1952, 6. 
160 “Coal Find in Tibet Reported,” NYT, Jan. 1, 1952, 6; “Czech Reds Reported in Tibet,” NYT, Feb. 22, 1955, 
6. 
161 M. G. Chitkara, Toxic Tibet under Nuclear China (New Delhi, India: APH Publishing, 1996), 43-44. 
54 
 
 
Bamboo Curtain could see the PRC’s modernization campaign with their own eyes, and the 
PRC press published continuous updates thereof, PRC politics were always obscure.  As a 
result, Americans during the early 1950’s only caught a glimpse of the tensions between the 
PRC administration in Tibet and the Tibetans themselves.  Accompanying the Dalai Lama 
from his retreat in Yadong was General Zhang Jingwu, head of the PRC’s mission to Lhasa.  
Upon reaching Lhasa, Zhang set up his mission’s headquarters and soon thereafter Americans 
learned PLA troops marched into Lhasa for the first time to insure the Seventeen Point 
Agreement’s implementation162.  However, the news that Zhang’s mission in Lhasa at once 
initiated drastic economic reform that included confiscation of wealth from the Tibetan elite 
and redistribution of land was patently false163.  In actuality, PLA troops were under strict 
orders not to antagonize the Tibetan population.  Instead of seizing the Tibetan aristocratic 
and monastic elites’ wealth, the PRC administration in Tibet showered aristocrats with silver 
dollars to pay for needed supplies and generously gave alms to monks and monasteries164.  
Trumbull implicitly corrected the report with his own article that said Zhang’s alms-giving to 
every monk in each of the “three pillars of state” continued the tradition of imperial and then 
GMD patronage, while at the same time attempted to appease fighting monks who were 
reportedly not suffering their liberation well165.       
 Americans were not completely aware of the Tibetan opposition that Zhang faced 
upon accompanying the Dalai Lama back to Lhasa, but coverage of events in Tibet became 
gradually more alarming.  The fighting monk situation became among the first indications 
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of growing differences between the PRC administration and “independent Tibetans” when 
reports reached Kalimpong that the Chinese Communists demanded Sera, Drepung, and 
Ganden Monasteries surrender their arms and ammunition166.  News that Zhang declared 
equality between Tibetan men and women followed after fighting monks reportedly 
assassinated a female cadre on the grounds of Jewel Park, where women were not allowed167.  
Food shortages and inflation tightened the tension between the two sides.  Lhasa’s 
population doubled by the end of 1951, not including all of the thousands of draft animals 
that the PLA brought with it168.  Americans learned that the situation was so bad that the 
PLA was forced to “borrow” forty thousand pounds of barley grain from the Kundeling 
Monastery in Lhasa as the Tibetan National Assembly convened ratify the Seventeen Point 
Agreement169.   
 All of the silver cash that the PRC administration used to purchase necessary food, 
fodder, and firewood for thousands of troops and animals pushed up the price of 
commodities.  Americans knew of inflation in Tibet early on170, but not of its true extent.  
From the time the PLA arrived in Lhasa in August 1951 to November 1951, the price of 
barley grain (Tibetans’ staple food) more than doubled.  The price nearly doubled again by 
April 1952171.  It took time for the effects of the PLA’s presence to reach the American 
public, but in April 1952, Americans learned that the Tibetan government in Lhasa banned 
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the production of alcohol from grain172.  Later, in December 1953, the New York Times 
reported that the PRC administration banned the Tibetan New Year prayer festival citing near 
famine conditions173.  The commodity shortage and resulting inflation was a public relations 
disaster for the PRC administration that was trying to implement Mao’s plan of gradually 
winning hearts and minds. 
III 
 From underneath the apparent food shortage and inflation, resentment in Tibet against 
the PRC administration boiled over and onto the printed page.  Although the American 
press completely missed the early controversy over the integration of Tibet’s army into the 
PLA, which the Seventeen Point Agreement stipulated, and the simultaneous dispute over the 
Tibetans’ insistence on continuing to fly their national flag, Americans caught glimpses of the 
development of the People’s Association among the general Tibetan populace.  For National 
Day, October 1, 1951, the PRC administration wanted to fly its flag on the Potala Palace and 
the Tibetan military headquarters, to which one of the two Tibetan acting prime ministers 
said, “How can you put two flags on one house?  What kind of custom is that?  How can 
two people sit on one chair?  This is not possible, and it will never be possible174.”  
Meanwhile, instead of relinquishing command of the Tibetan army to the PLA, the Tibetan 
government disbanded all but three regiments by March 1952 and many ex-soldiers lingered 
in Lhasa175.  With no work and nothing to do, some of these soldiers came together with 
other Tibetans who were frustrated by their government’s inability to resist the PRC 
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administration176.  The Tibetan government was stuck between PRC authorities, who 
demanded that it take action against the growing anti-Chinese sentiment, and the coalescing 
of an anti-Chinese group, known variously as the People’s Association, Assembly, or 
Representatives177.   
 The People’s Association met openly, which explained how news of “Public agitation 
against the Chinese Communist occupation of Lhasa...[which] has risen to the point where 
the Tibetan government has been forced to make official representations to the Chinese 
authorities asking them to remove a large part of their garrison lest there be an uprising178” 
reached newsstands in April 1952.  Two days later, the New York Times reported, “The 
situation in Lhasa, Tibet, is deteriorating rapidly under the food scarcity, with the dissatisfied 
Tibetan public holding daily meetings and anti-Chinese demonstrations in the city.  Walls in 
Lhasa are plastered with posters demanding that the Chinese Communists withdraw from 
Tibet179.”   Popular resentment nearly caused the resumption of hostilities, but culminated 
with the two acting prime ministers’ – whom the PRC authorities blamed and the People’s 
Association championed – resignation and the People’s Association’s breakup.  Still, 
Trumbull reported in December 1953 that an “anti-Communist people’s party” reemerged 
from having been driven underground to challenge the PRC administration openly180.  As 
tension between what Americans saw as a subjugated people and their Communist 
conquerors increased, so too did the coverage of events in Tibet, but initially very slowly. 
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IV 
 After the Dalai Lama ratified the Seventeen Point Agreement and Zhang established 
the PRC’s military administration in Tibet, the Tibet Question fell out of the American news 
cycle for several years.  Between the ongoing Korean War and the 1952 presidential 
campaign between then retired US Army general, NATO commander, and President of 
Columbia University Dwight Eisenhower and Illinois governor Adlai Stevenson, there was 
little room for Tibet on the newspaper page after hostilities ceased.  The news that came out 
of Tibet was relatively unexciting compared to news in August 1953 that the USSR had 
broken the US monopoly of the hydrogen bomb, for example.  Nevertheless, American 
journalists kept their readers informed of the PRC’s efforts to integrate and modernize Tibet, 
which alarmed Americans.  In Americans’ imagination, the progress of road building and 
other modernization efforts in Tibet signified the physical spread of Communism.  Wiley’s 
assertion that the USSR was building airplanes in Tibet or Trumbull’s news story of secret 
Soviet airfields were as baseless as McCarthy’s accusations during the contemporaneous Red 
Scare, but for the American public they rang true.  Unbeknownst to Americans, they were 
witnessing Mao’s gradualist Tibet policy in action, but news from Tibet attracted few big 
names from news organizations such as the New York Times except when the news was of 
simmering Sino-Tibetan tension. 
Part 4: Tibet Resurgent, 1954-1959  
 Following the Seventeen Point Agreement’s signing, violent resistance to PRC 
administration occurred only sporadically on a local level, mostly in the Tibetan provinces of 
Kham and Amdo.  Widespread, violent rebellion broke out in spring 1956 when semi-
nomadic Goloks massacred a PLA garrison in the town of Dzachuka in Amdo. That summer, 
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Khampas around the city and monastery of Litang followed suit.  In both cases, the PLA 
responded with a punitive campaign by bombing towns and monasteries, and by “the classic 
acts of a rampaging and vengeful army181.” After Litang monastery’s remains stopped 
smoldering, a Khampa merchant named Gompo Tashi Andrugtsang resolved to unify the 
fractious Khampas against a common enemy.  Gompo Tashi was not alone.  He and other 
like-minded nationalists such as the Dalai Lama’s elder brothers, Taktser Rimpoche and 
Gyalo Thondup, organized groups and demonstrations, kept Tibet in the press, and secretly 
fed intelligence to foreign nations in hopes of securing support.  In exile in India since 1952, 
Gyalo recruited an Indian Christian of Tibetan ancestry to change the Tibetan language 
magazine he irregularly published, The Tibet Mirror, into a weekly news source182.      
 Contemporaneous to resurgent Sino-Tibetan hostilities was the failed 1956 Hungarian 
Revolution.  Nikita Khrushchev had succeeded Joseph Stalin following his death in 1953 as 
leader of the USSR and seemingly ushered-in a relaxation of Stalinist terror and policies.  
However, in October 1956 a spontaneous revolt erupted in Budapest as students protested 
against their Soviet-dominated government.  Hungary was an independent nation, but a 
member of the Warsaw Pact, and the student demonstrations quickly turned into a popular 
uprising across the country.  On October 24, Americans read that the Hungarian government 
had declared martial law in the capital and called on Soviet troops to put down rioters.  The 
day before, soldiers opened fire on a crowed gathered in demonstration outside of the 
Budapest radio building, killing one.  Meanwhile, demonstrators across the city waved 
Hungary’s red, white, and green national flag and displayed banners saying, “Do not stop 
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half way: Away with Stalinism,” “Independence and Freedom,” and so on183.  In the 
following days, Soviet and Hungarian troops crushed the uprising, which unfolded before the 
American public’s eyes in black and white.  Time magazine editors switched their choice of 
“Man of the Year” to the “Hungarian Freedom Fighter” at the last minute in January 1957184, 
but none of the daily coverage or numerous editorials praising Hungarian “martyrs” had any 
effect because neither the UN nor any other nation intervened by the failed uprising’s end in 
early November.  One Hungarian refugee remarked bitterly, “The Russians, after all, were 
acting like Russians.  But we expected more from the West than to be let down this way185.”         
 In the face of building Sino-Tibetan conflict, Tibet gradually rejoined the American 
news cycle during the 1954-1959 period.  Seven Years in Tibet’s bestseller success indicated 
that Americans were still interested in Tibet’s Lost Horizon image, but not in the reality of the 
Dalai Lama’s apparent cooperation with Communism.  Journalistic discussion of Tibet 
languished for lack of a news story that could capture the American public’s imagination 
until news of Tibetan rebellion hit newsstands.  However, the quality of journalism 
remained largely unchanged and American journalists preferred to romanticize Khampa 
“tribesman” fighting against Communist “occupation” rather than discuss the Tibet Question.  
The 1956 Hungarian Revolution was a shocking episode in the midst of the post-Stalin 
“Khrushchev thaw,” and just as the invasion of Tibet paralleled the Korean War in 
Americans’ minds, the failed 1959 March Uprising conjured analogies in the press between 
events in Budapest and Lhasa.  In the March Uprising’s wake, American journalists began 
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to relinquish their role in shaping Americans’ perception of the Tibet to such individuals as 
the Dalai Lama.          
I 
 In early 1954, Seven Years in Tibet became an American bestseller and the New York 
Times staff gave Heinrich Harrer’s book rave reviews.  Even though New York Times book 
critic Orville Prescott called Harrer’s book a “spare” and “not very well written” chronicle, 
Harrer nevertheless won-over Prescott and many Americans with his account of his 
incredible adventures.  After escaping from a British prison camp in India in 1944, Harrer 
and fellow Austrian Peter Aufschnaiter made their way into Tibet originally planning to reach 
friendly Japanese lines.  Through inhospitable terrain during winter 1945, they reached 
Lhasa and found their way into a Lhasa noble’s home.  Harrer initially made a living as a 
gardener and English tutor, despite not having previous experience as a professional gardener 
and only a basic grasp of the English language himself.  He also served as a translator for 
the Tibetan government, constructed dams, and even taught Tibetans how to ice skate, or 
“walking on knives.” He ultimately left Tibet for safety as the Dalai Lama took up residence 
in Yadong186.  Famous Indian writer Santha Rama Rau wrote another review for the New 
York Times that showered Seven Years in Tibet with praises:     
Tibet is conventionally the land of romance, of mystery, of fantasy.  Almost 
anything written about it is bound to have a special magic.  Certainly, 
Heinrich Harrer’s “Seven Years in Tibet” is no exception – in fact, it tells one 
of the grandest and most incredible adventure stories I have ever read, 
compounded of the infallibly exciting elements of mountain climbing, 
dangerous escapes, life in secret, forbidden Tibet and encounters with 
extraordinary people. 
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One of extraordinary people Harrer met was the young Dalai Lama, whom Harrer tutored on 
a myriad of subjects.  Rama Rau called the relationship between the god-king and the 
Austrian as reminiscent of Anna and the King of Siam (which Richard Rodgers and Oscar 
Hammerstein II had recently adapted into a multiple Tony Award-winning hit musical, The 
King and I)187.   
 Seven Years in Tibet hit all of the right notes at exactly the right time and was the New 
York Times Book-of-the-Month Club’s February pick.  Thomas, who served as Tibet’s 
unofficial ambassador to the US through his popular radio broadcasts, called Seven Years in 
Tibet, “A BOOK [sic] that will make the needle of your insomniagraph behave like a sky 
rocket...One of the most unusual adventures of our time...Don’t miss Heinrich Harrer’s seven 
years in the land the lost horizon188.” Although Norman Vincent Peale’s The Power of 
Positive Thinking monopolized the top of the New York Times best seller list for non-fiction 
throughout 1954, Harrer’s tale of adventure stayed on the list for sixteen (non-consecutive) 
weeks, peaked at fifth place, and only fell off completely by the second week of July 
1954189.  The New York Times also selected Seven Years in Tibet and 299 others among 
approximately 10,000 books published in 1954 to recommend to its readers for Christmas190.   
 Clearly, Americans were still interested in Tibet, especially the Tibet of Lost Horizon.  
Seven Years in Tibet became a best seller precisely because of its depiction of Tibet, not for 
its literary merit.  In Harrer, Tibet found another celebrity spokesperson who started to push 
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Tibet back into the journalistic conversation in 1954 to end the decline of news coverage.  
Rama Rau quoted Harrer as saying “My heartfelt wish is that this book [Seven Years in Tibet] 
may create some understanding for a people whose will to live in peace and freedom has 
won so little sympathy191.” Despite the book’s popularity and subject matter, Tibet’s 
comeback into the news cycle was a slow process.  It is impossible to determine whether or 
not Seven Years in Tibet directly caused increased press coverage of events in Tibet, but its 
blockbuster success certainly corresponded with a gradual upturn.            
 Around the time Seven Years in Tibet fell off the Best Seller List, the New York Times 
reported that the Dalai and Panchen Lamas were about to leave Tibet for Beijing at the 
PRC’s invitation192.  The Dalai Lama left Lhasa in July 1954 and arrived in Beijing in 
September.  In Beijing, the Dalai Lama attended the Chinese National People’s Congress, 
which produced the PRC’s first constitution, met Mao, attended numerous banquets and 
meetings, and greeted Nehru as the first head of a major non-Communist state to visit the 
PRC.  The PRC also made sure the Dalai Lama and members of his delegation saw the 
PRC’s industrial achievements, which suitably impressed the Tibetans193.   
 The amount of coverage of the Dalai Lama’s trip to Beijing and tour of various 
locations throughout China was not great.  In fact, the New York Times waited to publish a 
feature story or any photograph of the two incarnation’s tour until the PRC announced the 
formation of the Preparatory Committee for establishing the Tibet Autonomous Region 
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(PCTAR) in March 1955194.  In contrast to such prior coverage of the Dalai Lama as his 
flight to Yadong, what Americans read about the Dalai Lama’s journey to Beijing was 
quicker, more to the point, and sparser on details.  Although the New York Times initially 
only reported that Tibetans urged him not to leave, tens of thousands turned out to watch the 
Dalai Lama’s five hundred man delegation depart while some cried and nearly threw 
themselves in the Kyichu River as the nineteen-year-old incarnation crossed in his special 
coracle195.  Just as in coverage of the Dalai Lama’s flight to Yadong, there were physical 
and political limitations on what American reporters could see of events in Tibet, but 
American interest had clearly waned by this time.  Americans were apparently eager for 
Harrer’s depiction of Tibet that struck a Lost Horizon tone, filled with excitement and 
adventure, but not for the reality of Tibet and the Dalai Lama’s ostensible cooperation with 
Communism.    
 Unlike coverage of the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet or the Dalai Lama’s flirtation 
with exile, there was a Western journalist in Beijing on hand to report his observations: 
James Cameron from the News Chronicle of London.  The New York Times published 
several of Cameron’s dispatches, including one about how he accidentally managed to obtain 
the Dalai and Panchen Lamas’ autographs, with the Dalai Lama’s signature purposefully 
written first196.  Even though Americans could see events transpiring in Beijing through a 
Western journalist’s eyes, the American press put emphasis on other events occurring in 
Beijing over the Dalai Lama.  Cameron’s journalism provided an extraordinary opportunity 
for Americans to receive eyewitness testimony on the two most important Tibetans behind 
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the Bamboo Curtain, but Cameron’s own experience meeting the Dalai Lama was buried by 
his reporting on how much the PRC loved foreign delegations.  Incidentally, Cameron also 
provided a means of historical corroboration when he sent his dispatch to the New York Times 
reporting Nehru’s unexpected encounter with the Dalai Lama.  While Nehru was in Beijing 
for Sino-Indian talks, he unexpectedly ran into the Dalai Lama in a situation Cameron 
described as “piquant,” stating, “Mr. Nehru appeared to do a swift double-take, then 
embarked on a most animated conversation, to which the Dalai Lama replied with bemused 
nods.” To the Dalai Lama’s recollection, it was Nehru who was bemused and spoke only 
superficially197.  Even though the PRC press made sure to waste no photo opportunity of 
Mao and the Dalai Lama together at the Tibetan New Year’s banquet in Beijing, the New 
York Times only published a 132 word blurb on the event, without a photograph198.  The 
American press had at its disposal an unprecedented view of the boy god-king, but made 
little use of it.     
II 
 Reports of Tibetan unrest trickled into the American newsstand beginning in 1954.  
A report from Taibei in August 1954 claimed that forty thousand Tibetan farmers had 
revolted some months earlier.  The ROC Defense Ministry claimed the uprising occurred 
“in the rice-growing areas of southeastern Tibet, south of the capital city of Lhasa199.”  Of 
course, no rice grows on the Tibetan plateau south of Lhasa, and even though the economic 
situation in central Tibet generated resentment, it produced no peasant uprisings.  However, 
there was a kernel of truth to the report in that it indicated the supposed revolt stemmed from 
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Tibetans protesting heavy taxes.  It is likely that the ROC Defense Ministry discussed a real 
revolt, but located it incorrectly.  Although the PRC implemented no “democratic reforms” 
in areas formerly under Lhasa’s control, ethnically Tibetan areas under direct PRC 
administration (i.e. in present day Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan) underwent 
democratic reforms at the same time as ethnically Han areas.  In these ethnically Tibetan 
areas, hostilities broke out in 1952-1953 as the PRC attempted to alter Tibetan society.  A 
Tibetan participant who escaped claimed that over eighty thousand rebels took part in the 
fighting in Kham and Amdo, including twelve thousand Nationalist army deserters200.  The 
PRC defended its actions to quash the sporadic rebellions in areas it considered not part of 
Tibet as its legal right, but failed to realize that even though its argument was legally sound, 
Tibetans under or beyond direct PRC administration were still Tibetans201.   
 Reports in 1954 on Tibetan armed rebellion perfectly illustrated the American press’ 
inconsistency in representing what was geographically “Tibet.” In October 1954, the New 
York Times published a report on armed uprisings in Kham, which reportedly forced the PLA 
out of the area and the PRC to grant the area “full local autonomy.” The report centered on 
the area around Litang, but even though Litang was located in the Chinese province of 
Xikang – presently in Litang County, Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan 
Province – the New York Times report stated “Recent armed uprisings have forced Chinese 
Communist troops to evacuate part of northeast Tibet.”  The report also added that the 
eastern half of Kham province, which corresponded to Xikang, was the “only practical 
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gateway to Tibet from China proper202.”  To add to the confusion, the New York Times 
printed a report in October saying that leaders of the rebellion in Kham were being taken to 
Lhasa for trial, suggesting that all of Kham was “Tibet203” even though Khampas were 
spread out across multiple intra-political boundaries.  However, maps that the American 
press sometimes printed next to articles concerning Tibet represented the region as roughly 
congruent to the entity now called the TAR.  The maps found in the New York Times or 
Newsweek (below) were likely not meant to be drawn to precise scale, but the ethnically 
Tibetan provinces of Amdo and Kham were obviously missing from Tibet in the three maps 
from 1946, 1951, and 1959204, which were typical.  Nevertheless, whenever American 
journalists reported on events in ethnically Tibetan areas, they generally referred to those 
areas as “Tibet” when Tibetans were involved.  This also explained why there was so much 
confusion around the PLA’s invasion of Tibet during the 1950-1951 period; depending on 
one’s definition of “Tibet,” the start of the PLA’s invasion could have been placed much 
earlier than the first week of October 1950. 
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III  
 Sporadic, localized violence in ethnically Tibetan areas from 1951 to 1955 
temporarily died down after rebels failed to attract foreign support and the PRC eased its 
reform policy205.  However, in the beginning of 1956, atheist indoctrination, forced 
disarmament, heavy taxes, and rapid collectivization sparked renewed armed rebellion, 
starting in the Golok nomad region of Amdo.  The rebellion in Amdo spread to eastern 
Kham when Khampa chieftains came together to organize, who then laid siege to a number 
of isolated PLA posts.  The PLA inflamed the rebellion when it destroyed the Litang 
Monastery in response and the second wave of Tibetan rebellion spread like wildfire in 
ethnically Tibetan areas206.  News of the 1955-1956 “Kangding Rebellion” first reached 
American newsstands in May 1956207. Whereas previous reports of violence attracted no big 
journalists’ names, Rosenthal reported from Katmandu that he received an account from one 
of the attendees of the Nepalese monarch’s coronation ceremony that rebels wiped out a six 
hundred man PLA garrison in eastern Tibet.  Rosenthal noted that although there was no 
confirmation of the incident or other reports of unrest – Chinese Communists attending the 
coronation denied the report – Rosenthal also commented, “Although highly competent 
authorities in [Katmandu] say the reports are exaggerated, they believe the Chinese 
Communists have found Tibet...considerably more difficult to handle than they had 
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expected208.” In the same way that Sino-Tibetan conflict drove coverage of Tibet during from 
1950 to 1951, reports of widespread rebellion once again launched Tibet into the forefront of 
the American news cycle beginning in 1956.   
 An editorial that followed Rosenthal’s report on the Nepalese royal coronation 
presented American alarm over Communist expansion from the Tibetan plateau, through the 
Himalayan nation, and into India.  Political agitation in that region of the world caught 
news media attention and immediately launched a flurry of coverage on the unconfirmed 
reports of Tibetan unrest: “Tibet Rebel Regime Reported,” “Tibet Action Reported,” 
“Tibetan Unrest Retold,” and “Dalai Lama in Appeal” all in May209.  There were more news 
articles on Tibetan hostilities in one month in 1956 than in 1954-1955.  History repeated 
itself in that the American press forwarded reports out of Kalimpong, gleaned from 
“reliable” traders and travelers, without being able to verify their stories.  Just as before and 
immediately after the PLA’s invasion, there were still no Western reporters in Tibet.  
Richard Hughes, a British journalist for The Times of London who visited mainland China 
during this time, wrote a piece for the New York Times in June 1957 that debated the value of 
having Western journalists in the PRC.  In describing the working conditions of Western 
reporters, he commented: 
A WESTERN [sic] correspondent in Communist China finds the surface 
contrast with the silent and implacable official hostility in other Communist 
countries at once disarming and encouraging.  Beneath the surface of 
impeccable Chinese courtesy, there are inevitable handicaps and frustrations.  
He can, in general, travel and photograph where and what he likes...But he 
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will find that requests for Army permission to visit Amoy, opposite Chiang 
Kai-shek’s stronghold on Taiwan (Formosa), simply go unacknowledged, and 
that Tibet, open to him in theory, is in practice sealed off for lack of a 
commercial airline210.” 
 
The Bamboo Curtain made no difference to the American press covering events in Tibet 
because Tibet’s geographic limitations, not political boundaries, sealed it off from outside 
eyes. 
 As in the case of reports of the PLA’s invasion, the New York Times reported accounts 
of violence in Tibet and the Indian government refused to publicly acknowledge the rumors. 
The New York Times expressed the reason why India was reluctant: “Information on Tibet 
comes from Kalimpong in northeastern India, a town that lives on caravans and rumors211.” 
Once again, Americans mostly received their news from American journalists as hearsay 
because journalists reported what other journalists heard from their sources.  That is not to 
say that hearsay was never accurate.  On June 30, 1956, the New York Times repeated the 
New Delhi newspaper The Statesman’s accurate report: “The Tibetans’ grievances were listed 
by [a Statesman correspondent] as heavy taxation, interference by the Chinese with religious 
indoctrination of Tibetan youth, ‘crippling land reforms’, and a general desire for the return 
of independence212.”  That is also not to say the quality of American journalism allowed 
Americans to receive a complete perspective of the Tibetan rebellion.  For instance, the 
same New York Times article that forwarded the Statesman’s journalism also mentioned that 
Tibetan rebels massacred an 850 man PLA garrison – Rosenthal heard from his source 600 – 
in northeast Tibet after the PRC instituted land reform.  Americans waited until August 8, 
1956 to hear confirmation from Beijing that there was no rebellion in Tibet, but there was 
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trouble in the Ganzi Autonomous Prefecture in western Sichuan213.  In fact, Zhou later 
stated in December that he never heard of any revolt in Tibet, but commented, “If what you 
meant is the armed conflict between some people in Szechwan with Chinese armed forces, 
then that is over and entirely different214.” If confusion over unverifiable reports of rebellion 
was not bad enough, Zhou might have created confusion over the entire matter based on 
conflicting definitions on where Tibet was. 
 History repeated itself with regards to the quality of journalism on events from Tibet, 
but there was an added dimension.  From exile in India, Gyalo led a group of Tibetan 
nationalists who organized to discuss Tibetan events, lobby Indian officials and members of 
Parliament, hold rallies and picnics, and publish news through the Tibet Mirror.  In 1954, 
floods of historic proportions devastated the PRC, including Tibet.  Although the PRC 
initially blacked-out news of the catastrophe within Tibet, the exiles organized themselves 
into the Tibetan Welfare Association and arranged for the Statesman to publish an article on 
the deadly flooding215.  The New York Times followed the story as well, and after publishing 
a death toll of three hundred in Gyantse via the Associated Press in New Dehli, a New York 
Times article on the devastation in Shigatse mentioned Gyalo by name and his “flood relief 
committee216.”  The Statesman published (then as it does now) out of major cities across 
India, including New Delhi, and from the time the Tibet Mirror became a weekly mouthpiece 
of Gyalo’s exile nationalist organization to 1959, American news organizations referenced 
the English-language Statesman frequently.  Just who were the frequently-cited “reliable 
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sources” in Kalimpong – Gyalo’s organization’s home base – who supplied American 
journalists was one tantalizing question, but just how much Tibetan exile news found its way 
into the American journalistic discussion by way of the Statesman is another.           
IV 
 The Dalai and Panchen Lamas’ trip to India also produced headlines in the American 
press while Tibetan unrest continued into 1957, despite Zhou’s assertion to the contrary.  
Americans received confirmation on November 17, 1956 of earlier rumors that the two 
highest incarnations in Tibetan Buddhism would attend the final celebrations of the 2,500th 
anniversary of “Buddha’s Birthday,” or Buddha Jayanti.  The PRC initially refused the two 
Lamas permission to go on pilgrimage at Indian invitation.  One such excuse was that the 
weather in May 1956 (when Buddha Jayanti began that year) “will be too hot for the Dalai 
and Panchen Lamas217.” Although the New York Times published the announcement in a 
brief, forty-four word article218, the Dalai Lama’s visit quickly produced longer feature 
articles.  Rosenthal, then a New York Times correspondent for South Asia, followed the 
Dalai Lama’s pilgrimage and the warm reception he received.  His coverage squarely 
focused on the Dalai Lama over his younger counterpart, implicitly because of the Panchen 
Lama’s status as “Peiping’s favorite219.” Moreover, Rosenthal depicted the Dalai Lama as 
charming in spite of the political whirlwind around him as Zhou simultaneously paid India a 
diplomatic visit: 
The city’s [New Delhi’s] attention was on the Communist Premier, and 
consequently a strangely moving little speech made today by another visitor 
passed almost unnoticed.  While Mr. Chou was being feted, the Dalai Lama 
was speaking to a group of Buddhist scholars meeting here.  This “living 
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Buddha” of Tibet, a 21-year-old man of grace and smiling charm, made a 
prediction in his talk that “even in our present life, hatred, exploitation of one 
another and the ways and deeds of violence will disappear, and the time will 
come when all will live in friendship and love.”   
 
Rosenthal more clearly juxtaposed Zhou as “captor” and the Dalai Lama as “captive” in a 
subsequent feature on Sino-Indian-Tibetan relations spread across five pages in the New York 
Times in January 1957.  While Rosenthal carefully noted that many in Asia believed Zhou 
to be the hero and the Dalai Lama the villain, as representations of power and change, and 
oppression and exploitation, respectively, it was clear from his reporting that American 
sympathies laid with the “slight young man with a smile of tenderness who has been remote 
from the world and rules a land in high Asia only through the consent of his captors and the 
faith of his people220.” The Zhou-Dalai Lama dichotomy fit well in American sensibilities; 
Sulzberger later described Zhou as “the Pied Piper of Peiping” who used his “individual 
charm and political magic to lead an important number of non-Communist statesmen into a 
mental cavern similar to that reserved for children by the medieval tootler221.” 
 The Dalai Lama’s pilgrimage to India allowed Western journalists access to the 
person whom Americans most associated with Tibet.  The Dalai Lama never gave 
interviews to Western reporters, but while he stayed in India the American press was able to 
show its audience a more personal perspective of the young god-king than ever before.  
Outside of the geographic limitations that hindered journalism, Tibet assumed a human face 
in print and in photographs from mainstream news media such as The New York Times and 
news magazines such as Time, its partner magazine Life, and Newsweek.  The New York 
Times even published an account of how much he and the Panchen Lama apparently enjoyed 
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riding an elephant, as well as a picture of the pair adjusting the settings on their newly-
bought motion picture cameras222.   
Whereas the American press described the Panchen Lama, “who is Chinese trained and 
dominated223,” as a PRC puppet224 (photograph below), the Dalai Lama, with his 
unassuming charm and talk of peace, friendship, and love even though he was the PRC’s 
“captive,” became a sympathetic figure.  A report out of Taibei that said the Dalai Lama 
was under house arrest after his return to Lhasa in April reinforced the perception of the 
Dalai Lama as captive under Communist rule.  Although the part about his housing having 
modern conveniences was true, the Dalai Lama was not forcefully confined, but only 
studying for his final monastic examinations in a new palace at Jewel Park225.    
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 In contrast to the duo of incarnation’s tour of China only a couple of years earlier, the 
Dalai Lama’s pilgrimage to India received greater attention by far.  From 1954 to 1955, 
there were a plethora of photographs of the Lamas with the upper echelons of PRC 
leadership (as the Dalai Lama himself recalled).  However, the American press made little 
use of them.  There was also at least one Western journalist in Beijing at the time who 
literally bumped into the Dalai Lama, but declined to ask the cleric for anything other than an 
autograph.  During the Dalai Lama’s trip to India, which the American press repeatedly 
billed as his own while leaving the Panchen Lama in the background, photographs and 
quotations of the Dalai Lama repeatedly wound-up in American newspapers and magazines, 
in contrast.  Granted, Western journalists had better access to the Dalai Lama (they could 
take pictures of the Dalai Lama themselves, presumably), but that did not explain why the 
American press believed the Dalai Lama was suddenly worth a significant increase in page 
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space; the Dalai Lama was not the one driving American attention towards Tibet; Sino-
Tibetan conflict was. 
V 
 Remarkably, in contrast to earlier American interest in the Tibet Question, or even the 
PRC’s modernization campaign in Tibet, there was no discussion about Tibet’s status in the 
American press’ coverage of Tibet’s political integration with the PRC.  News reporters 
never stopped to wonder just what “autonomous” meant in its coverage of the political 
establishment of the TAR from 1955 to 1959.  In March 1955, the New York Times reported 
the creation of the Preparatory Committee for the establishment of the Tibet Autonomous 
Region’s (PCTAR) while the Dalai and Panchen Lamas were visiting Beijing.  According to 
the Xinhua announcement on which the New York Times reported, the TAR “will have the 
status of a state organ subordinate to the Central State Council headed by Premier Chou En-
lai” and the PCTAR’s main task was to prepare for regional autonomy.  This announcement 
also described two subcommittees for financial-economic and religious affairs, various 
departments to handle affairs ranging from health to animal husbandry, and many 
modernization projects, such as building a hydroelectric station in Lhasa226.  However, 
absent from the news article was any analysis as to what this meant for Tibet vis-à-vis China 
or what “regional autonomy” meant within the PRC.   
 Almost a year later, Lieberman, still the New York Times correspondent in Hong 
Kong, wrote an article covering the PCTAR’s formal inauguration in Lhasa in April 1956.  
Lieberman observed that the PRC gave no explanation for the long delay while also noting 
“Use of the term ‘preparatory’ indicated Tibet was not yet a full-fledged autonomous region 
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on a level with Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia227.” Although Lieberman gave his audience a 
critical clue to Tibet’s status within the PRC as minority nationality autonomous region, he 
did not discuss the political ramifications of Tibet’s transformation from some sort of 
suzerainty into a political entity akin to the Xinjiang Uyghur or Inner Mongolia Autonomous 
Regions.  Again, Lieberman listed the various details of the PCTAR’s organization and 
reiterated Beijing’s Tibet policy of unity, progress, and greater development, but never 
discussed the question of “what does this mean for Tibet’s political status?” on behalf of his 
audience. 
 Also according to Xinhua’s initial announcement in 1955, the Dalai and Panchen 
Lamas’ followers had resolved their historic differences.  Apparently, the New York Times 
was ignorant of this development’s political significance.  Its news article correctly 
described the separate groups comprising the fifty-one member PCTAR: fifteen from the 
Tibetan government in Lhasa headed by the Dalai Lama, ten from Panchen Lama’s office 
(including the Panchen Lama), ten from the People’s Liberation Committee of Qamdo 
(PLCQ), five PRC authorities in Tibet, and eleven members of major sects and religious 
institutions.  However, it failed to note that the PCTAR’s makeup effectively isolated the 
Tibetan government in Lhasa.  The PCTAR divided Tibet’s administration among three 
Tibetan groups of representatives, forty-six in total, and five additional CCP cadres228.   
 Dividing Tibet into three main groups was not a simple “divide and conquer” 
strategy, but reflected deep political divisions within Tibet.  Even before the contemporary 
Tenth Panchen Lama’s incarnation, the Dalai and Panchen Lamas’ offices had been in 
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conflict for decades.  The Panchen Lama’s secular and religious office’s inclusion into 
Tibet’s regional government was a dramatic elevation that brought it nearly on par with the 
Tibetan government in Lhasa in terms of representatives within the PCTAR.  As noted 
previously, Lhasa also never exercised firm control of eastern Tibet.  After the PLA gained 
control of Qamdo and its surrounding area, the PRC established the PLCQ to manage the 
“liberated” area directly under PRC administration.  Following the Seventeen Point 
Agreement’s signing, the PRC did not return administration of the Qamdo region to Lhasa.  
Instead, a PLCQ composed of progressive Tibetans, religious figures from the area, formerly 
captured Tibetan officials, and members of the PLA remained a distinct unit until its 
incorporation into the PCTAR.  Although the Dalai Lama was Chairman of the PCTAR, he 
and his traditional government were in the minority among PRC designated or influenced 
members in Tibet’s new administration.  The New York Times followed PCTAR 
developments, including its official inauguration in Lhasa almost a year later and 
enlargement to fifty-five members, but it missed how the PRC co-opted the Dalai Lama’s 
government’s authority into a government of its own making while the PRC actually made 
decisions above the Tibetan representatives’ heads229.    
 Unbeknownst to either American news reporters or their audience, the PCTAR 
produced a great deal of tension behind the scenes.  Americans had no idea because on the 
surface the Dalai Lama appeared to accept the PCTAR by participating in the Chinese 
National People’s Congress during his stay in Beijing, by his outwardly charming appearance 
in India standing beside Zhou, and by the speech he gave at the PCTAR’s second 
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anniversary, urging the TAR’s establishment in April 1958230.  The PCTAR’s creation 
initially pleased the Dalai Lama and his government because they believed that they would 
again rule Tibet autonomously of Beijing.  This was an improvement over the previous 
military administration on paper, but Sino-Tibetan tension erupted immediately over the 
Tibetan army’s dissolution, the phasing out of Tibet’s native currency, and the Panchen 
Lama’s elevation of status231.  In practice, the Dalai Lama and his government found the 
PCTAR and lose power over Tibet’s government a hard pill to swallow.  Ultimately, all of 
the PCTAR’s members, decisions, and policies needed the PRC’s approval, which meant that 
the PCTAR was not politically autonomous at all, but only an extension of Beijing’s direct 
administration.  The Dalai Lama later wrote bitterly of the PCTAR’s inauguration in Lhasa 
in his second published autobiography:  
Whilst on paper [PCTAR] promised to mark an important advance towards 
autonomy, the reality was very different.  When Chen Yi announced the 
appointments, it turned out that of these fifty-one delegates (none of whom 
was [sic] elected), all but a handful owed their positions to the Chinese: they 
were allowed to keep their power and property so long as they did not voice 
opposition.  In other words, it was all a sham232. 
  
VI 
 After the Dalai Lama’s return to Lhasa, there were no continuing reports of violence 
with which American journalists could entertain their readers.  In early 1957, the New York 
Times reported that the Dalai and Panchen Lama’s appeals for acceptance of PRC 
administration quelled earlier uprisings against “occupation233.”  However, the absence of 
news of open conflict throughout 1957 masked boiling Sino-Tibetan tension between 
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hardliners on both sides.  Tibetan hardliners refused to accept changes towards integration 
with the PRC while their CCP counterparts pushed for socialist transformation of Tibetan 
society within Tibet proper234.  There was little excitement for Americans to read about 
Tibet as American news reporters followed what was actually Mao’s last attempt of a 
gradualist policy in Tibet after he postponed reforms for another six years.  Throughout 
1957, the New York Times reported that the PRC promised concessions to the Dalai Lama’s 
government in Lhasa, withdrew troops and cadre from Tibet, closed Chinese schools, and 
relinquished authority back to Tibetans.  An unnamed New York Times reporter wrote an 
article from Hong Kong calling the PRC’s move a “tactical retreat” aimed at alleviating food 
shortages, popular resentment, and Indian fears of a threat across its border235.  Even though 
Mao prevented socialist reforms within Tibet during the Great Leap Forward (the PRC’s 
second five-year plan, 1958-1962), his gradualist policy collapsed when renewed rebellion 
broke out in Tibet and ignited American coverage of Tibet in summer 1958.  Tibet might 
have once again fallen off of the American news cycle if it were not for another round of 
violence.     
 Although Zhou did not lie when he asserted that the PRC quelled the rebellion in 
ethnically Tibetan areas during Kangding Rebellion, he was not entirely correct either.  
Instead of crushing the spirit of rebellion for good, the PRC merely pushed the rebellion out 
of what it considered Chinese provinces and into Tibet.  Tibetan refugees and rebels from 
Kham and Amdo streamed into Tibet to escape the violence.  By 1958, fifteen thousand 
rebel and refugee families swamped Lhasa and exacerbated already existing, but still non-
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violent, Sino-Tibetan conflict.  PRC authorities then made a crucial error by trying to deport 
the refugees, which frightened the masses of displaced Tibetans to an area south of Lhasa 
called Lhoka. There, the Tibetan armed resistance re-organized itself236.  News of 
“Hungarian-type uprisings” in remote parts of China first emerged when Jiang declared that 
popular opposition to the PRC continued in Xinjiang, Tibet, Qinghai, and the border areas of 
Sichuan and Yunnan in spring 1958237.  Americans might have read the Generalissimo’s 
announcement of continuous uprisings alongside his usual appeal for American aid against 
Communism incredulously, but in summer 1958, news of renewed Tibetan unrest hit 
American newsstands.  The New York Times published reports of fighting and Tibetan 
refugees fleeing into Nepal and India while the PRC indefinitely postponed Nehru’s planned 
trip to Tibet238.   
 Through the dense fog of war, Tibet’s geographic boundaries, and the Bamboo 
Curtain, no concrete information emerged about a Tibetan guerrilla war or mass revolt.  On 
August 26, 1958, the New York Times picked up how the PRC tacitly admitted the existence 
of imperialist and reactionary “subversive plots and splitting activities in Tibet” through a 
published version of the Dalai Lama’s speech in Lhasa a month before239, but official 
confirmation of renewed violence was lacking.  All that Nehru would say about the 
situation in Tibet after he substituted a trip to Bhutan instead of Lhasa was that conditions 
were not “normal.” Journalists were so eager to report news about Tibetan rebellion that the 
article’s headline, “Nehru Indicates Unrest in Tibet,” was misleading; the article merely 
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quoted Nehru as stating, “Obviously conditions in Tibet, from such reports one gets, are not 
fully normal240.” Nehru did not actually indicate anything, but only said that there were 
reportedly abnormal conditions in Tibet.  
 Once again, rumor and hearsay infiltrated American news media with little in the way 
of journalistic analysis.  Time articulated the problem of reporting on the renewed unrest 
later in March 1959, “For years now, echoes have come across the lost horizon from remote 
Tibet that the Chinese Communists were having trouble digesting their 1950 conquest.  
Many of the reports of revolt and fighting came from refugees who in their excitement did 
not have all the facts straight, and when the details collapsed so did the reports241.” 
“Unconfirmed reports,” “Tibetan sources here in Katmandu,” “This information was 
furnished by a highly authoritative source that keeps in close touch with what goes on inside 
Tibet,” “a Nepalese businessman said here today,” and “according to reliable reports reaching 
here,” were the best with which the New York Times had to work before Elie Abel took over 
as the newspaper’s bureau chief in New Delhi.   
Abel was previously the Belgrade bureau chief where he covered the 1956 Hungarian 
Uprising, for which he and the New York Times staff shared a 1958 Pulitzer Prize.  His 
December 14, 1958 news article on the Tibetan rebellion was the first of that year to feature 
better analysis than previously brief statements on reported developments of the Tibetan 
unrest.  The article was also the first to at least partially rely on officially confirmed 
information.  Although Abel reported that that the Indian government affirmed that Khampa 
guerrillas were harassing the PRC’s vital transportation network in Tibet, he also clarified 
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“there is no support here for reports of a popular uprising in Tibet comparable to the 1956 
revolt in Hungary.  Such reports are considered in New Delhi to be products of wishful 
thinking by Chinese Nationalists242.” With Abel came better reporting about Tibetan unrest, 
but even the veteran bureau chief had little idea that Tibetan rebels by then effectively 
controlled swaths of territory in sparsely populated Tibet.          
 Despite Abel’s assessment, American journalists regularly compared Tibet with 
Hungary after news of the 1959 March Uprising broke toward the end of the month.  Abel 
himself broke the story for the New York Times on March 21, reporting that “open warfare 
against the Chinese Communist overlords of Tibet has broken out in Lhasa243.” Shortly after 
Nehru described the violence within Tibet as “more a clash of wills... than a clash of arms” in 
attempt to play-down the rebellion, the Indian Foreign Ministry admitted that nearly all of 
Lhasa had joined the fighting244.  In a piece entitled “Himalayan Hungary,” Newsweek 
compared the failed Tibetan March Uprising with the failed 1956 Hungarian Revolution in 
language reminiscent of the 1950-1951 period, “This, last week, was Red China’s answer to 
Tibet’s demand for independence.  In its ruthlessness, it recalled Russia’s blood bath in 
Hungary.  Eight years after the ‘peaceful liberation’ of one of the world’s most backward 
and unoffending countries, Communist ‘colonization’ (and the fiction of granting ‘local 
autonomy’) stood revealed for what it was – naked imperialism245.”  The same day 
Newsweek published “Himalayan Hungary,” its competitor, Time, published its own article 
on the Uprising in much the same vein and beneath a photograph of the Dalai Lama was the 
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caption, “Hungary all over again246.” The next week came a political cartoon in Newsweek 
depicting Khrushchev pinning a medal entitled “Order of Hungary” onto a blood-spattered 
Mao247.  Never before had Tibet captured the American imagination so vividly.  Over and 
over again, journalists and figures like the anti-Communist labor leader George Meany 
denounced the PRC’s response to the March Uprising.  As president of the American 
Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), Meany himself called 
Tibet “the Hungary of Asia248.” 
In the same way the invasion of Tibet paralleled the Korean War within the American 
consciousness, the March Uprising paralleled the Hungarian Revolution.  The American 
press helped form this context with headlines screaming PRC atrocities and describing the 
violence as a bloodbath.  On April 2, Abel reported that the PLA was forcing thousands of 
Tibetans into forced labor as PLA troops poured into Tibet to quell the continued, but 
hopeless, fighting.  With a tinge of romanticism, Abel described the woefully outmatched 
Khampa rebels as no match “for a determined campaign of extermination249.”  A day later, a 
former member of the Indian delegation to the UN, B. S. Gilani, wrote a letter to the editor of 
the New York Times claiming the Tibetan people were in danger of being wiped out not just in 
military conflict, but from starvation so long as the Indian-Tibetan border remained sealed.  
Gilani concluded with, “Let us be clear on Red China’s ultimate aim: It wants to colonize 
Tibet as it is doing surreptitiously in Sinkiang, Shensi and Mongolia.  It has a pretext now to 
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wipe out the Tibetan people.  Will the free world just stand by and watch250?”  In article 
after article, editorial after editorial, the emotional response to the March Uprising allowed 
American journalists and their readers to draw the comparison between Hungary and Tibet, 
as well as endow Tibetans fighting for “freedom” in the face of “Communist aggression” 
with a romantic air of martyrdom.  Sulzberger himself wrote an article entitled “The Free 
World’s Debt to the Khambas,” in which he stated toward the end, “We must thank the 
gallant Tibetans for this demonstration of freedom’s spark among the lesser known peoples 
in the remote Himalayan regions251.”  
 However, dissenting opinions did manage to join the journalistic discussion of Tibet.  
In response to Gilani’s accusation of colonization, a visiting professor at the University of 
Hartford and former ROC ambassador to the UN, Li Diezheng, wrote a letter of his own to 
the editor of the New York Times to refute the idea of colonization: “As a Nationalist Chinese 
I have not the least intention of defending Communist China’s policy in Tibet.  But the 
migration of the Chinese people from the overpopulated coast to China’s ‘wild west’ 
provinces should by no means be regarded as colonization.”  After pointing out that 
Shaanxi has been “Chinese” for centuries and that it once held the Tang dynasty capital of 
Xi’an, Li gave a legalist argument against the prevailing talk of Tibet as an independent state.  
Strangely, the self-proclaimed Nationalist Chinese even pointed to the Seventeen Point 
Agreement as evidence that Tibet was an autonomous part of China252.  Another letter to the 
editor called the proclaimed similarities between Hungary and Tibet only superficial: 
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In the first place, neither the United States nor any Western power has had any 
kind of commitment involving the independence of Tibet or the liberties of the 
Tibetan people.  This is not true in the case of Hungary, where a number of 
international agreements, vaguely worded as they may have been, were 
disregarded, violated or at best unilaterally interpreted by one of the 
signatories, the Soviet Union.  In the second place, neither the United States 
nor any Western power could reasonably regard Tibet as being within the 
sphere of Western strategic or historic interests, whereas the continued 
Russian occupation of Hungary represents the suppression of an ancient 
European nation whose historic and cultural connections have been European 
and Western253. 
 
Although these forays into the Tibet Question appeared on the pages of the New York Times, 
the charged atmosphere surrounding the March Uprising prevented dispassionate journalistic 
discourse. 
 Tibet became an international relations disaster for the PRC in the March Uprising’s 
fallout.  On April 1, Dana Adams Schmidt of the New York Times wrote, “Indignation over 
Communist China’s suppression of the Tibetan revolt is stirring the Asian neutralist world as 
Soviet suppression of Hungary’s rebellion in 1956 stirred the Western world.”  Americans 
might not have read foreign newspapers, but articles such as Schmidt’s reported foreign 
outrage.  In his article, Schmidt cited an editorial from the Indian Hindustan Times entitled 
“The Rape of Tibet,” which stated, “Let us hold our heads low.  A small country on our 
border has paid the ultimate penalty for its temerity to aspire to independence.  Tibet is 
dead.”  Schmidt also reported that the Burmese newspaper The Nation published an article 
under the headline “No Time for Neutrality” that asserted all Asians should condemn the 
PRC’s suppression of the March Uprising as a “‘typically imperialist’ suppression of 
autonomy254.” Abounding examples of foreign indignation appeared in Schmidt’s article and 
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in American news stories in general for weeks afterward.  Schmidt’s colleague at the New 
York Times, Tillman Durdin, later quoted Malaysia’s Minister of External Affairs as saying, 
“The Chinese Communists, in spite of all their professions of being peace-loving people who 
support the force of liberation have shown once again that they can be ruthless… As 
upholders of the United Nations Charter, we must deplore the failure to allow the Tibetan 
people to exercise self-determination255.” Although Durdin was careful to note that the 
perception of anti-PRC sentiment in Asia was sometimes being inflated, and that no 
neutralist nation changed its policy toward the PRC as a result of Tibet, that did not stop one 
editorialist from hoping that Nehru and other neutralists would “learn the full lesson of 
Tibet” and snap out of their neutralism256.   
VII 
 Once again, US foreign policy toward Tibet did not shape journalistic conversation of 
Tibet.  Although Acting Secretary of State Christian Herter immediately denounced the 
PRC’s suppression of the March Uprising publicly, the New York Times article that carried 
Herter’s statement noted that the State Department was weary of giving any impression that 
the US government instigated the revolt257.  This was no accident.  American journalists 
and their readers were unaware that there was some truth to the PRC’s claim that “foreign 
imperialists” were to blame for the March Uprising and the Dalai Lama’s subsequent exile in 
India.  Since the mid-1950’s, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had recruited and 
trained Tibetan agents for the purpose of bolstering the Tibetan armed resistance.  The 
CIA's involvement in Tibet originated on a policy level directly from Secretary of State John 
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Foster Dulles and Under Secretary Herbert Hoover Jr. (Herter’s predecessor).  Significantly, 
the CIA’s objective was not to achieve Tibet’s independence, but only hinder and harass the 
PRC as part of the Eisenhower Administration’s policy to challenge Communism at every 
opportunity other than costly overt military confrontation.  The CIA made the decision to 
lend support to Tibetan rebels in summer 1956 before the limits of covert intervention were 
made clear that autumn in Hungary258.  By 1959, the CIA airdropped over a half-million 
pounds of munitions and equipment to the growing Tibetan armed rebellion with CIA-trained 
agents’ assistance259.  Two of the Tibetan agents even made good use of their radio training 
when they intercepted the Dalai Lama’s escape party and helped secure the Dalai Lama’s 
asylum in India260, but the CIA was not directly responsible for the March Uprising.  
 However, other voices besides those of journalists’ gradually began to take over 
discussion of the Tibet Question in the March Uprising’s wake.  As previously noted, 
American journalists gave up rational discussion of Tibet in favor of emotionally-charged 
rhetoric.  Into this vacuum of debate over the Tibet Question stepped the Dalai Lama, 
whose escape from Lhasa into exile made him an international celebrity overnight.  The 
PRC’s manhunt for the twenty-five-year-old cleric made the first page of the New York Times 
and a “crush of correspondents from many parts of the world” awaited the Dalai Lama at 
Tezpur just across the Indian border in Assam261.  Under the caption, “The Escape That 
Rocked the Reds,” the Dalai Lama’s bespectacled portrait graced the cover of Time magazine 
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published a day after he arrived262.   Earlier, the PRC proclaimed that the Dalai Lama had 
been kidnapped263, but the New York Times published the Dalai Lama’s entire statement 
issued at Tezpur which asserted that he fled to India of his own free will.  Moreover, the 
statement ventured into discussion of Tibet’s historical status vis-à-vis China as well as 
recent developments vis-à-vis the PRC: 
It has always been accepted that the Tibetan people are different from the Han 
people of China.  There has always been a strong desire for independence on 
the part of the Tibetan people.  Throughout history this has been asserted on 
numerous occasions.  Sometimes the Chinese Government has imposed their 
suzerainty on Tibet, and at other times Tibet has functioned as an independent 
country.  In any event, at all times, even when the suzerainty of China was 
imposed, Tibet remained autonomous in control of its internal affairs.  In 
1951, under pressure of the Chinese Government, a seventeen-point 
agreement was made between China and Tibet.  In that agreement the 
suzerainty of China was accepted as there was no alternative left to the 
Tibetans. 
 
But even in the agreement it was stated that Tibet would enjoy full autonomy.  
Though the control of external events was to be in the hands of the Chinese 
Government it was agreed that there would be no interference by the Chinese 
Government with the Tibetan religion and customs and her internal 
administration.  In fact, after the occupation of Tibet by the Chinese armies, 
the Tibetan government did not enjoy any measure of autonomy, even in 
internal matters, and the Chinese Government exercised full powers in Tibetan 
affairs264. 
     
Instead of American journalists, the Dalai Lama began to shape Americans’ 
perception of Tibet.  An editorial that appeared in the New York Times before the Dalai 
Lama officially reached refuge in India predicted that he would become a symbol of 
resistance against Communism265.  Despite Nehru’s attempt to prevent the Dalai Lama from 
assuming a political role, the Dalai Lama nevertheless became such a symbol.  Another 
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editorial illustrated the way his claims and statements, as well as reports of Communist 
atrocities, found relevance within Americans’ conceptualization of “Red China”:   
The Dalai Lama stands by his statement that Peiping flagrantly violated its 
pledge to respect Tibetan autonomy and made unprovoked war on the people 
of his country.  Reliable Indian sources report that Tibet has been turned into 
a vast prison camp, with monasteries damaged or destroyed by Communist 
artillery and whole villages wiped out, with no sign of life visible.  Food 
supplies have been confiscated, military rule imposed and refugees harassed.  
This is the penalty an inoffensive people is paying for not wanting or readily 
accepting the communization of their country266. 
 
Within the context of the Cold War and the prevailing parallel between Hungary and Tibet, 
the Dalai Lama later said in an interview published in the Statesman “that the people of Tibet 
were being subjected to ‘unbearable tortures day and night’267.” He then went on to publicly 
reiterate the Tibetan nationalist interpretation of the Tibet Question while simultaneously 
denouncing the PRC’s actions disregarding Tibetan autonomy and “inhuman treatment” of 
the Tibetan people268.  For Americans, the Dalai Lama was a living symbol of their 
perception of Communism, the PRC in particular, and the American public naturally gave the 
Dalai Lama the ability to shape their perception of Tibet.   
VIII 
 American interest in Tibet never completely diminished by 1954, but it was not until 
journalists had a compelling story with which they could capture their readers’ attention that 
the Tibet Question re-entered journalistic discussion.  As evidenced by the difference in 
popularity between Harrer’s adventurous Seven Years in Tibet and the Dalai Lama’s 
contemporary trip to Beijing, Americans were only willing to digest a certain perspective of 
Tibet.  The image of fierce Khampas (who made up the bulk of the Tibetan armed 
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resistance) rebelling against Communist “occupation” suited the American palette perfectly 
alongside the image of a young, charismatic Dalai Lama juxtaposed against an allegedly 
slimy, scheming Zhou Enlai.  It was therefore no stretch for American journalists to link the 
1956 Hungarian Revolution and the 1959 March Uprising, despite vast legal-diplomatic 
differences.  Abel and other’s assertion to the contrary – that Tibet was not “Mao’s 
Hungary269” – was a minority opinion. 
Significantly, news coverage of the March Uprising had room to grow in the 
American press.  Unlike the 1950-1951 period, the US was not overtly involved in a war 
overseas.  The Korean War ended without a peace treaty in 1953 and the US government 
had yet to escalate its involvement in Vietnam.  Furthermore, Khrushchev had yet to visit 
the US or bang his shoe on a table at the UN, Cuban counter-revolutionaries were still 
plotting the Bay of Pigs invasion, and the Cold War had not yet reached its apex during the 
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, among other notable events.  American journalists created an 
emotionally-charged atmosphere with their news coverage of Tibet as news of rebellion on 
the Tibetan plateau reached the outside world.  Although they did not themselves bring the 
Tibet Question into their own journalistic discussions of the March Uprising, journalists 
gradually ceded that role to such prominent figures as the Dalai Lama.    
Conclusion 
 The way American journalists framed Tibet reduced journalistic conversation of the 
Tibet Question to an emotional and polemical dialectic during the 1950’s.  Throughout the 
decade, fear of the “Red Menace” dominated international news and the Tibet Question did 
not enter the American news cycle until Tibet became embroiled in the Cold War.  From the 
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beginning of 1950 through the Seventeen Point Agreement’s signing in May 1951, the issue 
of Tibet’s status joined the “Communist versus Free World” dialectic.  As the Korean War 
and the Red Scare raged, American journalists perpetuated the parallel between Korea and 
Tibet as examples of Communist expansionism and imperialism in Asia.  Although Sino-
Tibetan negotiations and the Tibetan government’s appeal to the UN caused American 
reporters to address the Tibet Question, the majority of published news articles portrayed the 
PRC as a conqueror that illegally invaded Tibet.  After all, American journalists and their 
readers drew a distinction between “China” and “Red China,” the former having a legitimate 
interest in Tibet and the latter not.  However, American journalists all but ignored even the 
ROC’s claim of authority over Tibet.  Tibetan nationalists and their sympathizers never had 
to convince the American public that Tibet was an independent nation before the PRC’s 
invasion because American journalists did that job for them decades before contemporary 
Tibetan support organizations existed. 
 American journalists even framed the PRC’s efforts to modernize and physically 
integrate Tibet in a Cold War context.  Within this context, the PRC’s visible or imagined 
efforts to modernize Tibet by building roads, airfields, electrical generation facilities, mines, 
clinics, and so on assumed a threatening nature to Americans.  Although the current Dalai 
Lama (then and still does) appreciated the value of modernization for Tibetan society, 
American reporters had nothing good to say about any of it.  Instead, American journalists 
reported how the “Red Chinese” as “occupiers” sought to use Tibet to further Communist 
plans of expansion into South and Southeast Asia.  Even though the PLA had trouble 
feeding its border garrisons, Americans accepted phony reports and assertions that the USSR 
and the PRC were planning to use Tibet as a springboard to further Communist 
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“imperialism.”  Tibet fell out of the American news cycle after the Seventeen Point 
Agreement’s signing ceased open hostilities, thereby removing Tibet from the Cold War’s 
front lines, but news from Tibet lingered in the background of journalistic conversation.  
The American perception of the PRC, which journalists helped to create during the interim 
years when Tibet was not front page news, as only using Tibet to further its own agenda 
partially explains the popular notion in American society today that the PRC has only ever 
been a parasite illegally occupying a land that is not its own. 
 The greater part of the explanation as to why everyday Americans readily accepted 
the Tibetan nationalist principle that the PRC has illegally occupied Tibet is the way 
journalists covered the 1959 March Uprising and previous Tibetan rebellion.  The “David 
and Goliath” struggle between Tibetans fighting for “freedom” against the “new Communist 
imperialism” fit perfectly into American sensibilities.  In a way, the PRC’s actions in 
suppressing the March Uprising justified American antipathy towards the Communist world, 
just as the 1956 Hungarian Revolution had a few years earlier.  There was little room for 
rational discussion of the Tibet Question in the emotional and polemical journalistic 
atmosphere that followed.  After all, if an American journalist did not take a position 
against the PRC, it would have been construed as a position for the PRC, anticipating the 
current nature of academic debate of the Tibet Question.  The Cold War dialectic of “us 
versus them” precluded discussion of the Tibet Question at all because, in the American 
mindset, of course Tibetan nationalist principles were correct – Tibet was a victim of blatant 
Communist aggression.     
 Throughout the 1950’s, American journalists reported on news from Tibet in a way 
they believed their readers would like to hear it.  In turn, Americans read the news from 
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Tibet that they wanted to hear.  However, this was not a simple case of yellow journalism.  
The Cold War prevented unbiased journalistic discussion of international issues in general, 
but there were other significant factors with regards to coverage of Tibet.  Without any 
Western journalists actually in Tibet, witnessing events firsthand, American news 
organizations and their own reporters had to rely on either third parties to do their reporting 
for them or unnamable sources who typically provided stories of unknown accuracy and bias.  
Critically, Kalimpong, center of Tibetan nationalists in exile throughout the 1950’s, was the 
point of origin of many news articles by way of traders, pilgrims, refugees, and perhaps even 
Gyalo Thondup himself or his prototype Tibetan support organization.  It is no wonder, 
then, why American journalists failed to consistently define Tibet’s borders and created 
confusion between ethnographic and political Tibet.  According to their Tibetan sources, 
“Tibet” was where ethnic Tibetans inhabited and American journalists were responsible for 
propagating that idea to their readers long before Tibetan support organizations existed. 
During the 1950’s, journalistic discussion of the Tibet Question had little to do with 
the actual historic debate over Tibet’s status.  Instead, American journalists crafted a version 
of the Tibet Question that was palatable for their readers.  Not only did this version capture 
the American public’s sympathy, but it has also proven remarkably durable since the Cold 
War’s end.  American journalists never introduced the finer points of the Tibetan 
interpretation of the Tibet Question to their audience, even if they understood or knew of it 
themselves.  The Tibet Question therefore took on an entirely different meaning; it was 
never about Tibet’s status with regards to China, it was about America’s status with regards 
to China. 
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